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INTRODUCTION

Wisconsin is extraordinary in its attempts to secure political accountability of its judicial officeholders. This adherence to the populist ideal was not born of the western states
agrarian reform movement of the late 1890's,' nor of the LaFollette-inspired Progressive Movement with its national
motto of "initiative, referenda and recall ' 2 which followed
in the early 1900's and continued to be a power in this state
to the late 1930's. 3 The continuum of political accountability
has existed since the framing of Wisconsin's Constitution in
1848.
Methods for achieving accountability of public officials
have been debated from the birth of the Republic. During
the American Constitutional Convention framers Edmund
Randolph of Virginia, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina,
William Patterson of New Jersey and Alexander Hamilton
of New York, separately proposed judicial accountability
measures. All their plans required that federal judges serve
during "good behaviour" and be subject to removal by impeachment. 4 Hamilton, in written discourses, maintained
that to sustain judicial independence the sole method of judicial removal should be impeachment, 5 but also stated that
insanity should be pronounced a virtual disqualification for
judicial office.6 The framers of the Constitution ultimately
settled on an appointed federal judiciary serving during
1. H. AUSTIN, THE WISCONSIN STORY 236 (rev. ed. 1957).
2. B. MAXWELL, LAFOLLETTE AND THE RISE OF THE PROGRESSIVES IN WISCONSIN

201 (1956).
3. Id at 298.

4. J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 (Washington 1836). Randolph's plan is

found at 1 id at 143-45. This plan did not originally call for impeachment but was
amended to do so. 5 id at 188. Pinckney's plan is found at Iid at 145-49; Patterson's
plan is found at 1id at 175-77; Hamilton's plan is found at 1 id at 179-80.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491-93 (A. Hamilton) (A. Lodge ed. 1908).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 363 (A. Hamilton) (R. Hallowell ed. 1852).
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"good [b]ehaviour ' ' 7 subject to impeachment." Federal stat-

utory attempts to provide other remedies will be discussed in
the body of this article.
The sovereign states of the Republic adopted various

remedies to insure judicial accountability to the people. Impeachment is imbedded in the vast majority of state constitutions. Other methods of removing judges variously imposed
by the states are: address of the legislature, incompatibility

with another office of public trust, conviction of a felony,
recall, mandatory retirement, election and disciplinary proceedings. In most of the separate states one or two, and in

some instances three, of these accountability tools exist with

respect to judges.9 Only one state, Wisconsin, employs all

eight.
All of Wisconsin's elected officials are subject to removal

by impeachment, 10 election,I recall1 2 and conviction of a felony.1 3 Judges in the state can be constitutionally removed

from office for incompatibility,' 4 disciplinary proceedings,1 5

address of the legislature 16 and mandatory retirement.1 7 To
establish this extraordinary and all-inclusive demand of ju-

dicial accountability to "government by the people" the remedies of impeachment, address, election, conviction of a
felony and incompatibility were all encompassed in the 1848

draft of the Wisconsin Constitution.'
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.

The state constitution

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2(5), 3(6) & (7).
9. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1980-1981)
[hereinafter cited as THE BOOK OF THE STATES]. Methods for removal ofjudges are
found at 158-63; provisions for recall of state officials are found at 198.
10. Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1848, amended 1968).
11. Id art. VII, §§ 4(1), 5(2) & 7. These subsections of the Wisconsin Constitution relate to the election of supreme court justices, court of appeals judges and circuit
judges, respectively. For purposes of this paper the writer here refers only to those
constitutional provisions dealing with the elections of judges of courts of record.
12. Id art. XIII, § 12 (1926, amended 1981).
13. Id art. XIII, § 3.
14. Id art. VII, § 10 (1848, amended 1912 & 1977).
15. Id art. VII, § 11.
16. Id art. VII, § 13 (1848, amended 1974 & 1977).
17. Id art. VII, § 24(2).
18. H.A. TENNEY, J. SMITH, D. LAMBERT & H.W. TENNEY, JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 609-13
(Madison 1848) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL/WIsCONsIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1848].
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was amended to provide the remedy of recall by vote of the
people in 1926.9 Constitutional proposals requiring
mandatory retirement of judges and a provision allowing for
reprimand, censure, suspension and removal for cause or
disability of judges were ratified by the people in 1977.20
The purpose of this article is to specifically define, and
place in historical context, each of these judicial accountability measures. The article will then examine their actual implementation in populist Wisconsin-their respective use
and nonuse throughout the state's history. It will conclude
with a comparison of the eight remedies with the author's
recommendation for their retention or rejection.
II.

IMPEACHMENT

Impeachment is the most widely known of the common
law methods for removal of political officeholders and has
been most common for judges in the United States. 2 1 The
impeachment process begins with the lower legislative house
which investigates and votes charges against the accused official. The lower house functions as a grand jury,22 while the
upper house acts as a court for trial. 23 This procedure is
available in at least forty-five states of the union 24 and in the
federal system.25
19.

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

BLUE BOOK 241 (Biennial ed. 1981-1982) [hereinafter reference will be to the BLUE
BOOK and the edition year]. The statewide vote tally ratifying the recall proposal was
205,868 for and 201,125 against.
20. Id at 244. The proposal for mandatory retirement of judges met the approval of the referendum vote by a resounding vote of 506,207 for and 244,170
against. The people ratified the judicial discipline proposal by an astounding vote of
565,087 for and 151,418 against.
21. Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges, 20 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 144 (1936).
22. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 12 (1971).
23. K. CORR & L. BERKSON, LITERATURE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7 (1979).
24. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 9, at 158-63 (1980-1981). In W.
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 12, the author says that 46 states have adopted the
impeachment tool. It may be that a state has eliminated the tool since his 1971 writing. In any event, it is too much for this paper to set forth the state constitutional
citations for the impeachment remedy. Suffice it to say that Hawaii, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina and Oregon do not have the impeachment remedy.
25. The House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2(5). The Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments. Id art.
I, § 3(6) & (7). Federal judges hold appointed office during "good [b]ehaviour," id
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A. In England
Impeachment was first employed in England in 137626
and last employed there in the case of Viscount Melville in
either 1805 or 1806.27 In England it is, and always has been,
a criminal proceeding 28 applied against elected or appointed
officials, including judges, for any crime whatsoever. 29 Acof Commons and are judgcusations are made in the House
30
Lords.
of
House
the
in
ed
During that 430 year period, the impeachment remedy
rendered a great service to England's constitutional government by bringing to the fore ministerial responsibility to the
law. Impeachment applied to all ministries of the Crown
and maintained the supremacy of the law over all.31 Its disuse came about for a number of reasons. Parliament, in
wresting control of the government from the Crown, overused it and imposed it on the basis of such slender evidence
that it seemed that the fact that impeachment was essentially
a criminal proceeding was all but forgotten. Parliament perverted the remedy to eliminate persons with conflicting political views and programs. 2 In the eighteenth century
Parliament became a partisan body with its members made
up of Whigs and Tories, the precursors of the contemporary
Conservative and Labor Parties. Partisan politics in England generated a lack of statesmanship, a necessary ingredient to keep the remedy of impeachment pure. 3 Moreover,
this tool proved to be too "clumsy and dilatory" a weapon
for a complicated trial.34 Furthermore, the Act of Settlement
art. III, § 1, subject to "Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 1d art. II, § 4.
26. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 380 (3d ed. 1922); T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 204 (5th ed. 1956).
27. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supranote 26, at 380, and T. PLUCKNETT, sUpra note 26,
at 204, cite the date as 1805. However, 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 736
(Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone 4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as HALSBURY],
states Melville was convicted by impeachment and removed from office in 1806.
28. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 379-80; Berger, Impeachment ofJudges
and "GoodBehavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475, 1518 (1970).
29. 10 HALSBURY, supra note 27.
30. Id
31. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 382.
32. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 259-60.
33. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 384-85.
34. Id
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(1701) created the method of address to the Crown to be employed specifically against judges.35 This tolled the death
knell for impeachment of English judges.
B.

In the United States

The American colonial experience before and after the
Settlement Act was quite the opposite. Colonial judges were
appointed at the pleasure of the Crown, with one notable
exception.36 These judges, for the most part, were servile to
the Crown and its local representatives. This condition prevailed in all the colonies and was one of the principal reasons for the calling of the First Continental Congress. The
Congress, at its October 14, 1774, meeting, unanimously declared that all the colonies were entitled to the protection of
the common law and statutes of England because "their ancestors, at the time of their immigration, were 'entitled to all
rights, liberties, and immunities, of free and natural-born
subjects within the realm'. . .. -3"The Second Continental
Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, which
pointed out the Crown's failure to establish, by law, an independent judiciary.38
The Declaration led immediately to the years of intermittent debates concerning the formation of the Republic,
which was accomplished in a relatively crude form by the
adoption of the Articles of Confederation. 39 The judicial article provided an extremely cumbersome method of judicial
selection. 40 There was no provision for tenure or removal,
35. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 234.
36. By accident, a New York judge was appointed for good behavior. Berger,
supra note 28, at 1492-93. But see 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 364-66 (1959); Berger, supra note 28, at 1492-93 nn.89 & 90; Kaufman, The Essence of JudicialIndependence, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 671, 680-83 (1980).
37. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 4, at 44.
38. The Declaration of Independence paras. 10 & 11 (U.S. 1776), where the drafters list crown abuses as follows: "He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by
refusing his assent to laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges
dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their office, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
39. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 4, at 78. By March 1, 1781, all states had ratified the
articles.
40. Articles of Confederation art. IX (2).
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probably because the participants realized the Confedera-

tion was a temporary structure.
The framers, while despising English authority, relied on
their knowledge of English history and customs to create this

Republic. Impeachment was retained, but ultimately the
House of Representatives was given the sole power to impeach and the Senate given the sole power to try.41 On September 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention adopted the

present requirements that mandate judicial tenure during
good behavior, subject to removal by impeachment.4 2 The

Constitution became effective March 4, 1789. 43
In this country's history there have been hundreds of
complaints filed in Congress against federal judges. 4 Fifty-

five judges have come under congressional investigative
scrutiny.45 Seventeen judges resigned on investigation, nine
(one justice) were impeached, four were convicted, and the
rest were absolved from impeachable misconduct.46

Impeachment as a weapon for removal of corrupt, inept
or ill federal judges, or for any federal official, is almost impossible to implement. The nearest thing to it, recently, was
the Nixon/Watergate debacle of 1974. Some say Congress
could not afford the time to impeach and try a federal dis-

trict or circuit judge.47 As one writer put it, "Congress is
41. See supra notes 7-8.
42. I J. ELLIOT, supra note 4, at 317-18.
43. Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820).
44. 81 CONG. REc. 6178 (1937). This is a paraphrase of the statement of Congressman Sam Hobbs who alluded to the 150 year history of the United States. See J.
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 237, 243, 249 (1962), where he exhibits the faults in
congressional record keeping by citing cases not included in those records.
45. R. WHEELER & A. LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (1979).

46. Id; J. BORKIN, supra note 44, at 204.
47.

1 J. BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 233 (1912). Impeachment "is like a

hundred ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to aim at." Hatton Sumners,
judiciary chair an of the House of Representatives, stated concerning the Senate's
problems of trying federal judges, "[w]e know they [the Senate] will not try district
judges, and we can hardly ask them to do so:' 80 CONG. REC. 5934 (1936). Senator
William G. McAdoo stated after the trial of a federal judge:
[T]he matter of the process is such that, as evidenced in the recent proceeding,
it seriously interrupts for long periods the necessary transactions of important
legislative business, places an almost intolerable burden of hearing and weighing testimony upon senators already charged heavily with other responsibili-
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sometimes willing to suffer a misbehaving judge rather than
[to] stop the legislative activities of the United States
"'48

The original thirteen states chose diverse methods of judicial accountability. Some employed impeachment, some
address, while another chose conviction of a criminal offense. Delaware, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and Virginia all used impeachment
but with variant subject matter methods. Delaware allowed
for impeachment upon conviction of misbehavior at common law; New Jersey and Pennsylvania, removal for maladministration. Vermont also allowed for removal of lesser
judges for maladministration. In Virginia the impeached
judge was to be tried by the court of appeals. North Carolina provided for prosecution on the impeachment of the
general assembly or presentment for maladministration.49
A survey reports that prior to 1960 there were fifty-two
impeachments in forty of the forty-five states which employed this remedy. These resulted in nineteen removals
and three resignations.5 0 During the next ten years there
were five more prosecutions.5 ' The only subsequent state
impeachment proceeding was that of Judge Samuel Smith, a
Florida circuit judge, convicted by the Florida Senate in
1978.52
C. In Wisconsin
The framers of Wisconsin's Constitution chose impeachment as a remedy for removal of all elected officials. At
each of the state's constitutional conventions5 3 there was no
ties, and for this reason alone is always resorted to with extreme reluctance,
even in cases of flagrant misconduct.
Id He concluded that as a result judges, not having to fear impeachment, have a
"standing invitation to abuse their authority with impunity and without fear of removal." Id
48. J. BoRKiN, supra note 44, at 195.
49. Berger, supra note 28, at 1495.
50. Brand, The Discioline ofJudges, 46 A.B.A. J. 1315 n.2 (1960).
51. W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 13. They occurred in Arkansas, Florida,
Missouri, Oklahoma and Tennessee but Braithwaite does not state whether these impeachments resulted in convictions.
52. Smith v. Brantley, 400 So. 2d 443, 446 (Fla. 1981).
53. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 1; JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
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debate on the propriety of this common law removal method
covering all "civil officers for corrupt conduct in office or for
crimes and misdemeanors." In Wisconsin the legislative assembly is the accuser and the trial takes place in the senate.
A majority of the elected members of the assembly is needed
to impeach. A two-thirds majority vote of the members
present in the senate is needed to convict. Conviction does
not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any other public office of honor, profit or trust in
the state. The person convicted, however, is liable to indictment, trial and punishment according to law. Upon impeachment no judicial officer can exercise his office until
acquitted. 4
In Wisconsin, there have been four attempts at impeachment of judges. One reached trial and acquittal; the other
three were either not acted upon or rejected by the assembly.
Levi Hubbell, the second chief justice of the state
supreme court and the first circuit judge elected in the second circuit was the first and only elected official to be tried
by impeachment. Judge Hubbell was one of five circuit
judges elected by the people after passage of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution. 55 It appears that Judge Hubbell, at the
conclusion of a murder trial in which the jury acquitted one
Radcliff, expressed his surprise at the acquittal. Hubbell
asked the jury foreman, "Is this your verdict?" The foreman
said, "It is." The judge then stated, "Then may God have
mercy on your consciences." This remark cut deeply one
William K. Wilson, a juryman, who on January 26, 1853,
appeared before the Wisconsin Assembly and demanded
VENTION 1848, supra note 18, at 610. See also W. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 113-18, 378

(Madison 1847) (daily journal of the 1846 convention) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL/
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846]. The constitution proposed by the
1846 convention was rejected by a referendum vote of the people by a vote of 14,119
for and 30,231 against. See BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 245.
54. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § I; Wis. STAT. § 17.06(1) (1979). See also Wis. STAT.

§§ 750.01-.02 (1979).
55. Biographical Sketches of the Judges of the First Supreme Court of the State
of Wisconsin, 3 Pin. 605, 610 (1876) [hereinafter cited as Biographical Sketches]. The
1848 constitution created five circuit courts and provided that the elected circuit
judges would comprise the supreme court until the legislature enacted a separate
supreme court and trial courts.
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Judge Hubbell's impeachment, charging him with numerous
acts of misconduct.16 The assembly rejected an address proposal and voted to proceed by impeachment. On March 22,
1853, the senate resolved itself into a court of impeachment.
Judge Hubbell was charged with eleven general counts
which contained sixty-eight separate specifications.
He
was charged with bribery, presiding over matters in which he
had a personal interest, giving the wrong sentences for
crimes, sitting as a circuit judge and a supreme court justice
in matters in which he had previously represented a party,
using court fees scandalously, acting as an advising lawyer to
parties
appearing before him, not being impartial, debauchm g women,
being arbitrary and oppressive, allowing ex
parte communications and arbitrarily intermeddling to stir
up litigation. Judge Hubbell's trial commenced on June 6,
1853,58 and concluded on July 11, 1853. 59 During the course
of the trial some of the specifications were abandoned, but
the senate voted by roll call sixty-four times, and on no occasion did a majority vote for conviction. Nineteen of those
roll calls were unanimously for acquittal.60 It appears that
Justice Hubbell was an able jurist 61 and was well liked by his
Milwaukee constituents, for on his acquittal and return to
that city a large committee met him part way, and a triumphant parade through the city streets was hastily organized.
Hubbell, however, realized his reputation as a judge had suffered serious injury and resigned in 1856.62
On March 15, 1929, a resolution was introduced in the
state assembly to investigate charges for impeachment
against Judge E.B. Belden, circuit judge of Racine, Walworth and Kenosha counties. 3 The assembly committee of
the judiciary was assigned to investigate the charges, and reported its findings to the assembly on August 29, 1929.64 It
56. J. WINSLOW, THE STORY OF A GREAT COURT 335-36 (1912); see also T. LELAND, TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF LEVI HUBBELL 3 (1853).

57. T. LELAND, supra note 56, at 5-19.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id at 26.
Id at 737.
Id at 790-819.
Biographical Sketches, supra note 55, at 611.
J. WINSLOW, supra note 56, at 17.
A. Res. 30, A.J. 470 (1929).
Id at 2381-83.
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found that Judge Belden had borrowed $2,000 from Z.G.
Simmons in 1915 or 1916. It further found that while the
debt was outstanding, he had presided over a trial in a case
named Lance v. City of Kenosha, and had ruled in favor of
Lance for a tax refund of $2,000. L.F. Lance was a stockholder in the Z.G. Simmons Company. Other stockholders,
including Z.G. Simmons, had similar claims against the city.
The judiciary committee also found that the judge had presided over a case involving the Concordia Fire Insurance
Company and the Z.G. Simmons Company, and had ruled
against the plaintiff insurance company. The judiciary committee report recommended that Judge Belden resign and
that the State Board of Bar Commissioners investigate
whether the judge should continue as a member of the bar.65
On April 19, 1930, the State Board of Bar Commissioners
reported to the assembly that it had no authority to remove
Belden as a judge, but that the legislature had the power of
impeachment and address for such removal. 6 However, no
further action was taken against Judge Belden.
In 1945 two separate petitions for impeachment of Milwaukee Circuit Court Judge Gustav G. Gehrz were filed in
the assembly, one by Josef and Eugenie Geiger and the other
by Christ P. Ganchoff6 7 The assembly judiciary committee,
which investigated the Geiger petition, reported that the petition should be dismissed and the judge exonerated of all
claims of impropriety. 8 That petition was dismissed May
31, 1945.69 The same committee unanimously recommended
that the Ganchoff petition be dismissed in light of the fact
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had affirmed Judge
Gehrz's decision on which Ganchoff's impeachment petition
adopted by the aswas based. 70 This committee report was
71
sembly with no recorded opposition.
It is apparent that the Wisconsin Legislature has been
loathe to impose the harshness of impeachment since the
65. Id at 2383.
66. AJ. -, 60th Sess. at 273-76 (1931).
67. A.J.

68.
69.
70.
71.

-,

67th Sess. at 80 (1945).

Id at 1311.
Id at 1346.
Id at 1619-22. See Ganchoffv. Bullock, 234 Wis. 613, 291 N.W. 837 (1940).
A.J., supra note 67, at 1622.
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1853 Hubbell case. It appears that it did everything it could
to avoid use of the tool in the Belden case, first suggesting
that the judge resign, then sending the matter to the Board of
Bar Commissioners and, finally, just ignoring the problem
by making no legislative move, be it impeachment or address, to resolve the issues. It also appears that the two petitions against Judge Gehrz were totally unfounded.
The same problems that caused England's nonuse of impeachment caused the federal government's nonuse and
Wisconsin's nonuse. Legislative bodies cannot function as a
court because their methods are too clumsy for the holding
of an effective trial. The costs of such a trial are outrageously high. In addition, there exists the serious problem
that impeachment's use by a legislative body may be colored
by partisanship.

III.

ADDRESS OF THE LEGISLATURE

Address and resolution are similar processes for removing judges from office. Address, while requiring the concurrent vote of both legislative houses, directs the chief
executive to remove an offending judge. Resolution requires
a concurrent vote of both houses ordering removal of a
judge without the necessity of approaching the chief
executive.72
The address method springs from the British Settlement
Act of 1701.71 The Settlement Act requires that "judges'
commissions be made quamdiu bene se gesserint74 and their
salaries ascertained and established, but upon the address of
both houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove
them. ' 75 Prior to this Act judges held their appointments
durente bene placito-at the pleasure of the King.7 6 From
72. K. CoRR & L. BERKSON, supra note 23, at 9.
73. 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2, § 3 (1700); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44041; Meador, English Appellate Judgesfrom an American Perspective, 66 GEo. L.J.
1349, 1352 n.3 (1978); Shartel, supra note 21, at 142 n.37; see also T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 26, at 248.
74. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *268 n.(u), interprets the Latin to read:
"During pleasure, but as long as they conduct themselves properly." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1117 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), interprets the phrase as "during good
behavior."
75. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 234.
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 74, at 1407.
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that time forward the English judiciary was completely and
permanently independent from the political arena,77 and it
became impossible for the Crown or the Houses of Commons or Lords to exercise pressure on them. Thus, the Act
ostensibly guaranteed the impartial administration of the
law, securing the liberties of the people against encroachments of claims of royal prerogatives and parliamentary
privilege.78 Judicial independence was firmly entrenched
with the addition of George III's statute giving the79judges
tenure beyond the life of their appointing monarch.
There are no specific grounds for which English judges
are removable by address.8 0 It must be noted that this supposedly is the exclusive method of removal for judges of the
major trial and appellate courts of England. 8 1 However, to
date, address has never been taken against any judge.82
On August 27, 1787, John Dickinson of Delaware, a
signer of the Declaration of Independence and a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, introduced an amendment to
the proposed judicial article of the Constitution which was to
follow the words "good [b]ehaviour. ' 's3 This amendment
adds: "Provided that they may be removed by the executive
on the application of the senate and house of representatives." The measure was voted down with only the Connecticut delegation voting aye. It appears that Dickinson voted
against his own proposal.8 4 It can readily be ascertained that
the founding fathers gave short shrift to address as a removal
tool.
The same cannot be said for the sovereign states of the
Union. As noted earlier, six of the original states provided
for removal by impeachment, but Maryland, Massachusetts,
77. T. PLuCKNETr, supra note 26, at 60-61.
78. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 234.
79. 1 Geo. 3, ch. 23 (1760); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *268.
80. Shartel, supra note 21, at 147.
81. Id at 146. Butsee Bergersupranote 28, at 1500 (challenges address as being
the exclusive English remedy for removal of judges and states that Lord Chancellor
Erskine, Holdsworth and others consider that address does not exclude other means
of removal, Ze., by impeachment, scirefacies or criminal conviction).
82. Meador, supra note 73, at 1352.
83. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1, is the adopted article, but on the date of Dickinson's
proposal he was amending the proposed judicial article II, § 2.
84. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 4, at 481-82.
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New Hampshire and South Carolina provided for judicial
removal by address. Georgia provided a variant in which all
state officials could be removed by address.85 By 1936 there
were twenty-eight states that constitutionally approved of
87
one form of address or another;8 6 today there are nineteen.
Some require the petition to be forwarded to the governor

for a letter of removal, some do not. Some require a majority vote.8 8 The others require a two-thirds vote with the exception of one which requires a three-fourths vote of both
houses of the legislature.8 9 Every state that has retained re-

moval by some form of address also retains the impeachment process. It should be obvious that address is to be used

for general judicial misprisions that do not reach the import
of conduct called for by impeachment. Even a cursory reading of these state provisions reveals wide discretion for the

legislatures' implementation.

Some do not limit the

grounds, while others require that specific charges be
presented to the accused judge, who is then allowed to present a defense with counsel.
Of all the states that have adopted address it appears that
Massachusetts has been the only state to consistently employ
the remedy. Its use of the remedy has been lauded 90 and
85. Berger, supra note 28, at 1495.
86. W. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 22, at 12; Shartel, supra note 21, at 146.
87.

CONSTITUTIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES-NATIONAL AND STATE (2d ed.

1980); ARK. CONST. art. XV, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; ME. CONST. art. IX, § 5;
MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4, MASS. CONST. pt. 2d, ch. 3, art. 1; MICH. CONST. art. VI,
§ 25; MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 53; NEV. CONST. art. VII, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. 2d, art.
LXXIII; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 23(a)-(c); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 17; R.I. CONST. art.
X, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; TEx. CONST. art. XV, § 8;
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 8; Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 13.
88. Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. See supra constitutional provisions
in note 88.
89. Washington. See supra note 87 for constitutional provisions.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 339-40 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
Madison, in discussing the necessity for the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches, cites with approval the contemporary Massachusetts Constitution, which calls for both impeachment and address, as required
overlapping of power between the legislature and the judiciary. While he does not
name it the system of checks and balances, it is obvious in his meaning. Frothingham, The Removal of Judgesby LegislativeAddress in Massachusetts, 8 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 216 (1914); Removal by Address in Massachusetts, 7 MASS. L.Q. No. 4 at 17
(1922).
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excoriated. 9' One author praises the scheme as being a very
fair solution as opposed to the "vicious" policies of other
states which allow election of judges and recall, 92 despite the
fact that address removal can be employed for any cause, or
no cause, without any restraint or limitation on the legislature's power. 93 Since 1787 eleveni Massachusetts judges have
been subjected to address and all but one were removed by
the process. 94 The excoriators claim that address destroys
substantive as well as procedural due process rights of the
subject judge. The claimed substantive due process rights
protect the legitimate expectations of the continuation of job
benefits 95 and the liberty interest in reputation. 96 These in
turn could trigger procedural due process which requires a
hearing accompanied by confrontation, cross-examination
and the right to call one's own witnesses as opposed to
merely being entitled to notice of an address hearing and
being allowed to be present and to answer questions of a
legislative committee. In short, because address is final and
unappealable, a responding judge should be entitled to the
full trappings of a trial, requiring a final written statement
delineating the judge's conduct which falls short of the
"good [b]ehaviour" constitutional standard.97
The framers of the Wisconsin Constitution, as noted earlier, chose the remedy of impeachment in both the 1846 and
the 1847-1848 conventions.9" They also adopted judicial address. The ten-member standing committee on the organization of the functions of the judiciary of the 1846
convention,99 called for removal by "concurrent resolution." '0 This was later deleted by amendment and the word
91. Note, Due ProcessConsiderationo(JudicialRemoval, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1319 (1979).
92. Frothingham, supra note 90, at 221.
93. Id at 218, 220; Commonwealth v. Harriman, 134 Mass. 314, 328 (1883).
94. Note, supra note 91, at 1331-43.
95. Id at 1343-47.
96. Id at 1355-57.
97. Id at 1372-75.
98. 1 Wis. STAT. ANN. 11 (West 1957). The 1846 constitution was rejected by a
vote of 14,119 for ratification and 20,333 against. But see BLUE BOOK (1981-1982),
supra note 19, at 245 (approval lost by a vote of 14,119 for and 30,231 against).
99. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846, sufpra note 53, at
24.
100. Id at 116.
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"address" was inserted. 10 The judicial0 3 article was engrossed' 0 2 and passed by the convention.1
Byron Kilboum, a Milwaukee County delegate to the
1847-1848 convention, opined that had the judicial article,
the banking article and the articles declaring exemptions and
the rights of married women been better put, the 1846 constitution would not have met the disapprobation of the people.1 4 It was the new committee's purpose to correct those
1846 errors. 5 The convention debates on the judicial articles centered on the election and tenure of the offices of
supreme court justice and circuit court judge. The delegates,
like their 1846 predecessors, rejected out of hand "good behaviour" tenure, but fussed over the length of the elected
term. At a meeting of the convention as a whole on January
19, 1848, the arguments centered on the length of term in
office. Some wanted to ensure judicial independence while
others demanded that the judiciary be responsive to the sovereign power-the people. 10 6 Kilbourn laid to rest the arguments against long terms (eight-year terms for supreme court
justices) by stating:
As to the danger of long terms on account of keeping a bad
judge, if one were unfortunately elected in office a long
time, there was a way provided in the bill to remedy that.
It provided that a judge may be removed by the legislature
on good cause being shown. It was not necessary that the
offense should be an impeachable one. It might be bad
habits, incompetency, anything which in the judgment of
the legislature made a change expedient. There the people
would have complete control over the judiciary, and there
could be no danger in a term of eight years.' 7
George W. Laiken, a Grant County delegate, moved on
January 22, 1848, to eliminate the address provision from
the judicial article because judges should not be subjected to
101. Id at 314.
102. Id at 361.
103. Id at 378.
104. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1848, supra note 18,

at 8.
105. Id

106. Id at 392-97.
107. Id at 397.
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such a vague and uncertain provision. 10 8 The measure did
not point to any judicial offenses and gave the legislature an

absolute and arbitrary power to remove judges. If the provision were retained he preferred reciprocal judicial address
for the members of the legislature. 0 9 With hardly any re-

sponse, the measure was defeated by a vote of fifty-two to
six . 0 On January 24 Laiken, because of his opposition to
address, reintroduced his proposal for reciprocal address by

the judiciary."' Louis P. Harvey, a delegate from Rock
County, responded by facetiously asking if "the gentleman
from Grant desired to let loose the tigers of the bench, the
lions of the bar and the hyenas of the legislature?" '" 2 The
measure was defeated on a voice vote." 3

Address was

adopted as part of the judicial article by the convention on
February 1, 1848,1 4 and ratified by a vote of the populace on
March 13, 1848."1 Address as adopted in Wisconsin does
not require presentment to the governor" 16 and is supple-

mented by statute'"7 and retained in the 1977 revision of the
judicial article of the constitution.

To date, Wisconsin has seen but one attempt to employ
108. Id at 457-58.
109. Id
110. Id at 458.
11. Id at 468-69.
112. Id at 469.
113. Id
114. Id at 598-99.
115. 1 Wis. STAT. ANN. 43 (West 1957); BLUE BOOK (1981-1982),SUpra note 19,
at 245.
116. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 13 (1848, amended 1974 & 1977):
Any justice or judge may be removed from office by address of both houses
of the legislature, iftwo-thirds of all
the members elected to each house concur
therein, but no removal shall be made by virtue of this section unless the justice or judge complained of isserved with a copy of the charges, as the ground
of address, and has had an opportunity of being heard. On the question of
removal, the ayes and noes shall be entered on the journals.
117. Wis. STAT. § 17.06(2) (1979):
Inthis section, "address" means a procedure for removal of ajudge from office
based on a document entitled "Address" which specifies charges against a
judge alleging misconduct or that he is not physically or mentally qualified to
exercise the judicial functions of his office. A copy of the address containing
the charges against him shall be served upon the judge. The judge shall have
the opportunity of being heard in his defense and he may be removed from
office by address of both houses of the legislature if two-thirds of all members
elected to each house concur therein.
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the remedy of address. On January 2, 1980, representatives
introduced joint resolutions for the removal by address of
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Christ T. Seraphim.8 One resolution called for the address remedy, 1 9
while the other alleged general charges, provided for investigation of those charges and mandated a procedure for a joint
hearing. The procedural steps mandated due process requirements at the legislative hearing. The judge was to be
allowed legal representation and confrontation rights. Both
sides were to present witnesses subject to cross-examination,
and both sides were to have the right of summation, after
which each house was to take its required vote for removal. 20 This proposed method seems to meet at least procedural due process requirements,21 but the legislature
never acted on these proposals, presumably because the Wisconsin Judicial Commission was investigating the same
complaints.2
Proponents claim that address is both swift and fair, 123 is
a necessary check on the otherwise unbridled power of the
judicial branch and reinforces the concept of balancing the
separate powers of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. 24 It appears, though, that the evils far outweigh
the good of removal by address. Address has, for the most
part, been political in nature and has not been based on the
guilt or innocence of a judge.'1 5 Address, as well as impeachment, lacks confidentiality, which can cause unwarranted
damage to reputation. 26 More importantly, however, address fails to protect the elemental civil rights of confrontation, cross-examination and summation-a judge simply
118. Wis. J. Res. 97 & 98, 84th Reg. Sess., A.J. 1809 (Jan. 2, 1980).
119. Id J. Res. 98.
120. Id J. Res. 97 at 2.
121. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 501-522 and accompanying text.
123. Frothingham, supra note 90, at 216; see also supranotes 90 & 92 and accompanying text.
124. Note, Removal ofJudges by LegislativeAction, 6 J. LEGIS. 140, 149 (1979).
125. Note, The Removal, Involuntary Retirement and Censure of FederalJudges:
The JudicialTenure Act in Context, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1081, 1087 (1979); see also
Note, supra note 91 and accompanying text; Comment, JudicialDiscipline, Removal
and Retirement, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 563, 566.
126. Note, supra note 91, at 1380.
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does not get a trial of the issues. 127 The legislative body
charged with the removal power is not equipped to handle
the role of judge. Lastly, the method is extremely inefficient
and expensive. 2 8 Address will remain in the Wisconsin
Constitution as a judicial removal tool but, just as in the
past, it will remain a dormant tool.
IV.

INCOMPATIBILITY

A third method of judicial removal is a finding of incompatibility. Simply stated, the doctrine of incompatibility
provides that a public officer cannot hold a second public
office which is inconsistent with or involves a conflict of interest with the first office. Few, if any, of the states adopted
constitutional prohibitions of this nature, but populist Wisconsin did. All elected public officials in Wisconsin, including the judiciary, are subject to the constitutional
incompatibility prohibition. 29
Certainly no such proscription existed in the early English common law. In 1066 William the Conqueror simultaneously held the offices of chief executive, legislator and
judge. 130 By the year 1307, the business of being king became so burdensome that Edward I created, defined the jurisdiction of, and appointed judges for the courts of King's
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, and also created the
so-called Model Parliament made up of lay advisers on taxation matters. 13' From this raw beginning grew England's
court system and Parliament's House of Commons.132 Eventually, parliamentary supremacy became absolute after the
revolution of 1688 when Parliament named William III and
Mary as King and Queen. From that date forward if Parliament could "name the crown it could break it.' 33 The final
127. Id But see supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
128. Note, Remediesfor JudicialMisconduct and Disabiliy: Removal and Discipline ofJudges, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149, 164 (1966).
129. Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 10(1) (1977): "No justice of the supreme court or
judge of any court of record shall hold any other office of public trust except a judge
during the term for which elected." See also Wis. CoNST. art. IV, §§ 12 & 13.
130. W. LUNT,HISTORY OF ENGLAND 84-85 (1947).
131. Id at 195-97; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *425-28.
132. W. LUNT, supra note 130, at 206-23.
133. Id at 463.
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separation of powers occurred in England with the Settlement Act of 1701 which made the judiciary independent of
both Crown and Parliament. 34 The judges apparently observed a self-imposed rule that they could hold no other
public offices when Parliament formalized the incompatibility doctrine by passing the House of Commons Disqualification Act, which provides that no judge of the high court is
capable of being elected to or seated in the House of Commons. 35 Of course, this prohibition does not exist for the
members of the House of Lords. Lords' members sit both as
legislators and, on occasion, in the dual capacity of judges of
the highest court of the realm.
James Madison, quoting Montesquieu, wrote: "'There
can be no liberty where the legislative and the executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates,' or, 'if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and the executive powers.' "136 He concluded this
political tract by maintaining that mere constitutional demarcation on parchment of limits on the three departments
of the proposed republic was not a sufficient guard against
these encroachments (mixing of offices in one person) which
lead to "tyranny
of all power of government in the same
37
hands."1
The framers of our Constitution thoroughly discussed the
issue of incompatibility as it had evolved in the common
law. Consistent with Madison's theory, they ultimately provided that:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of either
38
House during his Continuance in Office.'
This simple language forecloses the federal executive and
134. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *440; 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
26, at 234.
135. 10 HALSBTJRY, supra note 27, at § 867, 411 n.6 and accompanying text.
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 90, at 339-40.
137. Id at 347.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6(2).

1982]

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

the members of the federal judiciary from simultaneously
holding their offices and being members of Congress. But it
does not deter judges from seeking other political office. In
fact, John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
ran for governor in New York. After losing that election, he
ran again in 1795 and won. Only then did he resign from his
judicial office. 13 9 In 1875 Chief Justice Morrison Waite refused to be a presidential candidate because it would undermine the people's high regard for the Court. 140 To
date,
there is no constitutional or statutory provision keeping federal judges off the presidential ballot. The only deterrents
are the ABA Canons of Ethics for Judges adopted at the
1924 ABA convention in Philadelphia 14 1 and the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted at the 1972 ABA convention. 142 The
federal judiciary has decided to avoid incompatibility by
adopting these proposals. 143
Most states have adopted some form of constitutional incompatibility procedure and, as an adjunct, a majority of
states have adopted statutes requiring judges to resign when
running for nonjudicial office. 144 In addition, all fifty of the
states have adopted some form of judicial disciplinary system which operates under some form of code of ethics. 4 These codes of ethics all include some prohibition concerning judges holding office in political organizations or actively
participating in political organizations and require judges to
resign if they become candidates for partisan office in a general election.
139. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 76, 124
(1926).
140. 2 id at 563-64.
141. Canons of JudicialEthics, 47 REP. ABA 70-71, 760-74 (1924). Canon 30
required judges to resign from the bench to run for another office.
142. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 29 (1973);
Special Committee on StandardsofJudicialConduct, 97 REP. ABA 556 (1972). Canon
7A(3) required a judge to resign on becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial office.
143. Woodward, What the Morial Decision Means, 61 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 422
(1978).
144. Note, The ConstitutionalityofResign-to-Run Statutes: Morial v. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 571 (1979).
145. I.

TESITOR &

D. SINKS,

JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATION

12-18 (1980).

The Appendix Table lists the commissions extant in 49 states. See 2 JUD. CONDUCT
REP. No. 3 at 4 (1980), which notes that the state of Washington voters approved a
constitutional amendment creating a judicial commission.
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Wisconsin is the only state which has a four-pronged
prohibition against judicial incompatibility. The constitu148
tion, 146 a statute,147 and a code of judicial conduct rule

prohibit judges from holding other incompatible public offices. Moreover, a rule of the code of ethics prohibits judges
any other office without first resigning the
from running for
149

judicial office.

In its first report to the 1846 constitutional convention,
the Wisconsin framers' subcommittee on the judiciary proposed in part: "[Judges] shall hold no other office of public
trust, and all votes for either of them for any office except
that of judge, of the supreme or circuit court, given by the
legislature or by the people shall be void."' 150 This proposal
151
was reaffirmed in 1848 with minor grammatical changes
and ultimately became part of the constitution adopted by
the people's referenda. 51 2 The 1977 constitutional revision of

the judicial article is more tautly worded but has the same

meaning. 153 However, the 1977 version eliminates the lan-

guage "voiding" votes for any other office.
146. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 10(1), states in part: "No justice of the supreme
court or judge of any court of record shall hold any other office of public trust, except
a judicial office, during the term for which elected."
147. Wis. STAT. § 757.02(2) (1979): "The judge of any court of record in this
state shall be ineligible to hold any office of public trust, except a judicial office, during the term for which he or she was elected or appointed." This statute originated in
1913 Wis. Laws § 2, chs. 592 & 705.
148. Wis. Sup. CT. R. § 60.04: "A judge shall not hold any office of public trust
except a judicial office during the term for which he or she is elected or appointed."
Between January 1, 1968, and December 30, 1979, Wisconsin judges and justices
were governed by the Code of Judicial Ethics adopted by the supreme court on November 14, 1967. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252,
252-62a, 153 N.W.2d 873, 873-78, 155 N.W.2d 565 (1967).
Effective June 1, 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a number of
Supreme Court Rules, part of which renumbered the Code of Judicial Ethics, 1981
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.001-60.19 (West Special
Pamphlet 1980). Some changes will be noted between the old and new codes, but
those changes are immaterial for the purposes of this paper.
149. Wis. Sup. CT. R. § 60.05: "A judge shall not become a candidate for a federal, state or local nonjudicial elective office without first resigning his or her
judgeship."
150. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846, supra note 53,
at 115. The sentence is found in § 10, line 6 of the proposed judicial article.
151. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1848, supra note 18,
at 67. The sentence commences at § 10, line 4.
152. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (1848, amended 1912 & 1977).
153. See supra note 146.
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Incompatibility became an issue in 1946 when Joseph
McCarthy, while a circuit judge of Wisconsin's tenth judicial
circuit, campaigned for and was elected to the United States
Senate. Out of that election arose two bitterly fought cases
brought as original actions and decided in the state supreme
court. They are State ex rel Wettengel v. Zimmerman 54 and
State v. McCarthy.'" In Wettengel, the court determined
that the pre-1977 Wisconsin constitutional "void election"
language referred to above, was ineffective to disqualify a
circuit judge from being a candidate for nomination for the
office of United States Senator in either a primary or general
election.1 56 It stated that the United States Constitution
prescribes the qualifications of those to hold the office of senator; Congress can make or alter the time, place and manner
of state legislative prescription for the election to these offices; and each house of Congress is the judge of election
returns and qualifications of its own members. 57 The court,
paying silent homage to the supremacy clause, 15 8 held that
Wisconsin could not by constitutional or legislative enactment prescribe qualifications for a candidate for the office of
United States Senator in addition to those proscribed by the
Federal Constitution. 59 The court determined that McCarthy had violated his oath of office as a judge and as an attorney when he accepted and held the office of United States
Senator during the term for which he was an elected circuit
judge because he did so in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution and laws of the state. 60 Because he did not hold
the offices contemporaneously, 16 ' he was merely censured by
154. State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946).
This action sought decertification of the primary vote in which Joseph McCarthy defeated the Republican incumbent Robert N. LaFollette, Jr., on the basis that the votes
for McCarthy were "void" under Wis. CONST. art. VI1, § 10. The petition was
dismissed.
155. State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 38 N.W.2d 679 (1949). This action sought
bar discipline of Joseph McCarthy on the basis that in running for the office of United
States Senator he violated the ABA Canons of Ethics approved by the Wisconsin Bar
Association.
156. Wettengel, 249 Wis. at 247-48, 24 N.W.2d at 508-09.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4 & 5.
158. U.S. CoNST. art. VI.
159. Wettengel, 249 Wis. at 247, 24 N.W.2d at 508-09.
160. McCarthy, 255 Wis. at 243, 38 N.W.2d at 684.
161. Id
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the court. 162 McCarthy apparently resigned his position as
circuit judge in taking the office of United States Senator.
facto
Had he not done so, the office would have been ipso
163
vacated under Wisconsin's incompatibility doctrine.
The doctrine of incompatibility has been upheld in all
court contests in Wisconsin's history. Only two other cases
have dealt with judicial incompatibility. A circuit judge terminated his appointed court commissioner for accepting an
appointment as a federal court commissioner. The court
commissioner sought a writ of mandamus against the judge
in an original action in the supreme court. The supreme
court dismissed the writ because, under the Wisconsin Constitution, the two positions were incompatible and, on accepting the federal court position, the local circuit court
commissioner's position was ipso facto vacated. 64 In another case the state supreme court determined that election
to and acceptance of the office of city attorney by one holding the office of justice of the peace ipso facto vacated the
office of justice65 of the peace due to constitutional
incompatibility. 1
An adjunct to the incompatibility doctrine is the resignto-run statute. Although Wisconsin has no such statute, the
judicial code of ethics adopted by the supreme court in 1967
66
requires judges who run for nonjudicial office to resign.
There has been no Wisconsin court test of the rule since its
implementation in 1967. No sitting judge has run for any
office other than judge with the exception of Frederick P.
Kessler, Circuit Judge of Milwaukee County, who honored
the code by resigning on June 1, 1981, to run for Congress in
the 1982 fall election.
Resign-to-run rules, if attacked in the future, will undoubtedly rely for constitutional support on the Fifth Circuit
162.
163.
164.
(1918).
165.

Id at 250-51, 38 N.W.2d at 687.
WIs. CONsT. art. VII, § 10 (1946).
State ex rel. Hazelton v. Turner, 168 Wis. 170, 173, 169 N.W. 304, 305
State ex rel Stark v. Hines, 194 Wis. 34, 36, 215 N.W. 447, 448 (1927).

166. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 260, 153

N.W.2d 873, 877, 155 N.W.2d 565 (1967). Rule 3 is identical to the present Wis. Sup.
CT. R. § 60.05. See supra note 149.
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case of Morial v. Judiciary Commission. 67 Morial was an
appellate judge in the Louisiana state court system who
chose to run for the office of Mayor of New Orleans. Louisi169
ana had both a statute 168 and a code of ethics provision
prohibiting this. Morial petitioned the Supreme Court of
Louisiana for a leave of absence which was rejected. He and
thirteen citizens commenced a federal action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the statute and the code
provision denied their rights preserved under the first and
the fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. 70 The district court granted the relief sought, holding
that the statute and rule had a "chilling and inhibitory effect" upon the plaintiffs' free exercise of speech and associa71
tion in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, relying substantially on the Hatch Act cases in which the United States

Supreme Court upheld restrictions placed on political activities of federal civil service employees.1 72 It rejected a "balancing approach '1 73 analysis for a "means-end"'174 test
167. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:39 (West Supp. 1979). The statute provides that
no judge except ajustice of the peace may qualify as a candidate for nonjudicial office
unless he resigns at least 24 hours before the qualifying date.
169. LA. REV. STAT. ANN., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7A(3) (West Supp.
1979). This canon was an adoption of 7A(3) of the ABA Code of Judicial Ethics. See
supra note 142.
170. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d
295 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
171. Id at 608. The court granted a preliminary injunction barring Louisiana's
enforcement of the statute. Id at 612-13. It reasoned that immediate injunctive relief
was necessary because the citizen-voters would suffer irreparable harm and Morial, as
a candidate, would be placed at a severe disadvantage in the campaign. Id While
determining that the state had a compelling interest in averting judicial impropriety
as well as the appearance of impropriety, the statute and the canon were far too imprecise, ineffective and broad. Id at 611. The statutes and the canons significantly
and substantially burdened the fundamental interests of the parties and unduly restricted their first amendment rights. Id at 610. These provisions denied Morial's
fundamental right to run for political office and the citizens' right to vote for the
candidate of his or her choice. Id at 608-09. They also denied the judge equal protection by singling out judges from all of the other officeholders and requiring them to
resign to run. Id at 609.
172. Morial, 565 F.2d at 299 (citing United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601 (1973)).
173. Morial, 565 F.2d at 299-300.
174. Id at 300.
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when weighing the impairment of Morial's and the citizens'
first amendment interests against Louisiana's compelling
state interest in the integrity of the state's judicial system.
That court stated that "[tihe impairment of the plaintiffs' interests in free expression and political association [was]...
not sufficiently grievous to require the strictest constitutional
scrutiny,"' 175 but that those rights were of such magnitude as
to warrant a level of scrutiny requiring the state to show a
"reasonable necessity" for requiring the judge to resign
before being a candidate for elective nonjudicial office.176 It
determined that the state, to meet the reasonable necessity
test, needed to show that the statute and the code were
required.
The court held that Louisiana met the test by establishing that the statute and the code were properly employed to
prevent abuse of a judicial office by a judge during the
course of a campaign by using his office to promote his candidacy. 77 The reasonable relationship test was also met by
the state demonstrating the danger of judicial abuse that
might occur upon the judge's return to court duties after losing another electoral office.178 The court asserted that the
statute and the canon were reasonably necessary to Louisiana's interest in eliminating the appearance of impropriety
by judges both during and after a campaign. 79 The court
held finally that the plaintiffs' first amendment rights were
not burdened by implementation of the statute and the rule
because of the widespread adoption of the canon, 80 citing in
its appendix thirty-eight states' and the District of Columbia's adoption of similar resign-to-run canons.' 8 '
The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection
argument that judges who sought higher judicial electoral
office were protected by the statute and the code, but judges
who sought nonjudicial office were not so protected, and fur175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at 302.
at 303.
at 303.
at 307-08 app.

1982]

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

ther, that no other candidate for any Louisiana public electoral office was discriminated against in this fashion. The
issue presented by the equal protection argument was
"whether these classifications [were] reasonably necessary to
the vindication of Louisiana's interest in the integrity of its
elected judiciary."18 2 The court held that, because of the

special character of the judicial function, judges cannot campaign for election in the same manner as candidates for
other offices. A judicial candidate cannot campaign for judicial office by pledging or promising future results as can candidates for nonjudicial offices. The court concluded:
By requiring resignation of any judge who seeks non-judicial office and leaving campaign conduct unfettered by the
restrictions which would be applicable to a sitting judge,
Louisiana has drawn a line which protects the state's interests in judicial integrity without sacrificing the equally imin
portant interests in robust campaigns for elective office
83
the executive or legislative branches of government.
With the exception of State ex ret Wettengel v. Zimmerman and State v. McCarthy,1 8 4 Wisconsin has consistently

upheld the state's constitutional incompatibility doctrine for
officials, especially its judges. The doctrine denyall
ing public
judges the right to hold other offices of public trust, embodied in the constitution, the statute and the code of
judicial ethics, has survived state constitutional tests and will
withstand any federal constitutional challenge. Unless
Morial is overruled, it is almost certain that all states will
rely on it to protect resign-to-run statutes or ethics code restrictions. It is certain that populist Wisconsin will fight any
attack on the resign-to-run mandate of its Code of Judicial
Ethics because of the state's historically enduring interest in
judicial accountability.
V.

CONWICTION OF A FELONY

Common-law history teaches that impeachment was the
tool employed by the English government to rid itself of
182. Id at 304.
183. Id at 305.
184. See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text.
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public officials involved in, criminal conduct. 185 Later, address to the Crown was supposedly the tool used for judicial
misconduct. 86 However, a judicial office apparently could
also be terminated
by criminal information without address
87
Crown.
the
to
The framers of the national Constitution followed the
path of impeachment, stating that: "The President, Vice
President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 188 Most of the founding states chose either the impeachment or address remedy. North Carolina, a founding
state, adopted impeachment, but also employed an alternate
removal device with criminal
procedures of trial and convic189
tion in the court system.
Populist Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a separate
constitutional proposal prohibiting any person convicted of
any infamous crime in any court within the United States
from being eligible to hold any office of trust, profit or honor
in the state. 190 Other states have similar constitutional mandates once a felony conviction is finalized.' 9' Still other
states provide for removal on investigation and recommendation of the state judicial commission body. 192 A few states'
statutes provide for removal93through constitutionally authorized judicial commissions.1
185. See supra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
187. 8 HALSBURY, supra note 27, at § 1107, 680-81 n.5, refers to "Barrington's
case (1830) 62 Lord's Journals 599 at 602." See also supra note 81.
188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
189. See Berger, supra note 28, at 1495. Berger states that "North Carolina provided for prosecution on presentment for maladministration, ie., a judicial criminal
proceeding." See also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
190. WIs. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (1848).
191. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(a) & (b); IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 11 & 13; MD.
CONST. art. IV, § 4; Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 175.
192. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10; ALASKA STAT. § 22.30.070(b) (1976); LA.
CONsT. art. V, § 25(c); MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30(2); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 9;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.16(2) (West 1971 & Supp. 1981).
193. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11; MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1110(1) (1981); N.C.
CONsT. art. IV, § 17; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (1981); OR. CONST. art. VII, § 8; OR.
REv. STAT. § 1.420 (1981-1982); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 28; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-7-28(b) (1953).
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Wisconsin's adoption of this ineligibility proposal was an
afterthought of the 1846 convention. Twelve days before the
convention adjourned and after the bulk of the constitution
had been adopted, Edward (T. Ryan, 194 a Racine County
delegate, introduced the article decreeing ineligibility for
conviction of an infamous crime.195 The 1848 convention

adopted the proposal without debate 196 and it was approved
by the people's referendum.

The ineligibility provision was complemented by an 1849
statute that provided for immediate removal from office on

conviction of an infamous crime. 197 Later, the statute was

amended by replacing the words "infamous crime" with the
words "felony or other crime of whatsoever nature punishable by imprisonment in jail for over a year or more
.... 198 The constitutional and pre-1919 stautory "infamous crime" terminology was construed to mean a crime
punishable by sentence to the state prison. 99
Two Wisconsin judges had their offices vacated for con-

viction of a felony. Green County Judge John M. Becker
was an outspoken antagonist of America's entry into World
War I. In a speech at a public meeting called by the Green

County Board, he decried the war as a "richman's war" that
would engender "war taxes." At the time he was a Green

County judge with a term ending January 5, 1920. On Au194. Ryan was appointed prosecutor in the impeachment trial of Justice Levi
Hubbell. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text; see also T. LELAND, supra
note 56, at 34. Ryan was later chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court from
1874-1880. See J. WINSLOW, supra note 56, at 305-401. He is equated with Oliver
Wendell Holmes of Massachusetts and Thomas Cooley of Michigan as one of the
truly great state supreme court justices. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 332 (1973). It is unfortunate today that he is remembered only as the author of
an opinion in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied women the right to be
licensed attorneys on the basis that they should not be exposed to the harsh, unclean
issues, indecencies, vices and all the infirmities of society that are daily in the courts.
Motion to Admit Miss Lavinia Goodell to the Bar of This Court, 39 Wis. 232, 245-46
(1875).
195. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846, supra note 53,
at 398.
196. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1848, supra note 18,
at 618.
197. 1849 Wis. Laws § 11, ch. 2. See Becker v. Green County, 176 Wis. 120, 124,
184 N.W. 715, 717, aft'd on rehearing, 186 N.W. 584 (1922).
198. 1919 Wis. Laws ch. 362; Wis. STAT. § 17.03(5) (1919).
199. Becker, 176 Wis. at 124, 184 N.W. at 717.
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gust 6, 1918, he was convicted in the federal court of the

Western District of Wisconsin of violating the National Espionage Act and was sentenced to prison for three years.
The sentence was stayed pending appeal. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction in October 1920 (after Becker's elected term of office
ended), holding that as a matter of law the evidence did not
support the conviction. 200 This outrageous, politically motivated conviction20 1 destroyed Becker's judicial career.2 °2
In 1979 and 1980 the Wisconsin Judicial Commission investigated complaints of judicial misconduct against Iron
County Circuit Judge Alex J. Raineri. During the course of
the investigation it became apparent to the members of the
commission that Judge Raineri's activities merited federal
criminal investigation. The commission met with Frank M.
Turkheimer, then the United States Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin. Turkheimer had these matters investigated and took them to a federal grand jury. On June 6,
1980, the grand jury indicted Judge Raineri2°3 on three
200. Becker v. United States, 268 F. 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1920); Becker, 176 Wis. at
121, 184 N.W. at 715-16.
201. At the time of Judge Becker's vocal opposition to the United States' entry
into World War I, there were no canons or codes of ethics to advise the judiciary to
stay out of politics. See supra note 141 and infra note 400. Today such voicings on
emotional political issues would conflict with the ABA and Wisconsin Codes of Judicial Conduct. See E. THODE, supra note 142, at 29, 97. Canon 7A(4) provides: "A
judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to
improve the law, the legal system, or the administration ofjustice." See also Code of
Judicial Ethics, Wis. Sup. CT. R. §§ 60.01(14) & 60.14, supra note 148, which are the
comparable Wisconsin provisions.
202. Becker v. Green County, 176 Wis. 120, 184 N.W. 715, a]/'donrehearing,186
N.W. 584 (1922). Becker sought reimbursement for pay due him from August 6,
1918, to January 5, 1920. In a wholly apologetic and sympathetic decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the claim, concluding that because WIs. STAT.
§ 17.03(5), amended in 1919, became effective after Judge Becker's federal conviction,
he had no recourse to it. The statute has the following language:
Reversal of the judgment against such officer shall forthwith restore him to
office, if the term for which he was elected or appointed has not expired, but, in
any event, shall entitle him to the emoluments of the office for all the time he
would have served therein had he not been so convicted and sentenced, but
pardon shall not restore him to office nor entitle him to any of the emoluments
thereof.
203. Milwaukee Sentinel, June 7, 1980, § I, at I, col. 1.
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counts of violation of the Wisconsin criminal code2 4 (activities which were carried out in violation of the federal law
concerning interstate racketeering);205 one count of lying
under oath to a federal grand jury;206 and one count of
threatening a federal grand jury witness.20 7 At the same

time, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission filed a complaint
against Judge Raineri in the Wisconsin Supreme Court
charging that he had presided over a matter in which a near
relative was involved, a violation of the Code of Judicial

Ethics.20 8 The judicial commission complaint was later
amended to include a charge of automobile ticket-fixing,

also in violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. 20 9 The

supreme court held the disciplinary matter in abeyance
pending a determination of the federal criminal charges but
immediately suspended the judge without pay. 1 0 On December 18, 1980, after a jury trial, Judge Raineri was convicted of all the federal charges, 21 ' sentenced to three years
in prison and fined $15,000.212 The Wisconsin Supreme

Court took judicial notice in the state disciplinary case of the
conviction and sentence and acknowledged that the federal
conviction rendered Judge Raineri ineligible to hold the office of circuit judge under the Wisconsin Constitution;21 3 that

his office as circuit judge was vacated pursuant to state stat-

ute;214 and that the revocation of his license to practice law
rendered him ineligible for the office of judge. 1 5 Despite
204. Wis. STAT. §§ 944.30 & 944.34 (1979) (prostitution and keeping place of
prostitution, respectively).
205. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1952 (1980).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1980).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1980).
208. Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 60.03 (1980).
209. Wis. Sup. Ct. & 60.07 (1980).
210. In re Raineri, 102 Wis. 2d 418, 418-19, 306 N.W.2d 699, 699-700 (1981).
211. United States v. Raineri, 521 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d
702 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Rainer, 101 Wis. 2d 313, 314, 303 N.W.2d 842, 843 (1981).
Judge Raineri petitioned to have his license as an attorney revoked. The petition was
presented to the State Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility which recommended revocation. The state supreme court granted the motion and Judge Raineri's
license to practice law was revoked.
212. In re Raineri, 102 Wis. 2d at 419-20, 306 N.W.2d at 700.
213. WiS. CONsT. art. XIII, § 3.
214. Wis. STAT. § 17.03(5) (1979).
215. Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, § 24(1): "Tobe eligible for the office of supreme court
justice or judge of any court of record, a person must be an attorney licensed to prac-
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this, and presumably to impress the people of the state with
the seriousness of this misconduct, the court removed Judge
Raineri from the office of circuit judge under its disciplinary
power.21 6 The court held that its removal of the judge would
foreclose him from eligibility to serve as a reserve judge in
the future.217 Judge Raineri appealed the conviction but it
was affirmed.218 He began serving his sentence April 28,
1982.219

Populist Wisconsin's constitutional adoption in 1848 of
the automatic removal provisions for conviction of a felony
have served the state well throughout its history. This writer
is convinced that this constitutional mandate and the supplementary statute eliminate the political implications involved
in most impeachment and address attempts at removal and
provide due process not normally available when the address remedy is used. The court system's familiarity with
day-to-day trials is far superior to legislative bodies' unfa-

miliarity with trial practice procedure and rules. Finally, a
court proceeding is obviously swifter and the costs are certainly less than the impeachment or address remedy.
tice law in this state and have been so licensed for 5 years immediately prior to election or appointment."
216. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 11. See In re Raineri, 102 Wis. 2d at 421, 306
N.W.2d at 701.
217. See In re Raineri, 102 Wis. 2d at 421, 306 N.W.2d at 701; see also Wis.
CONsT. art VII, § 24(3):
A person who has served as a supreme court justice or judge of a court of
record may, as provided by law, serve as a judge of any court of record except
the supreme court on a temporary basis if assigned by the chief justice of the
supreme court.
Wis. STAT. § 753.075(2) provides as follows:
•The following persons may serve temporarily on appointment by the chief
justice of the supreme court as a reserve judge of the court of appeals or the
circuit court for any county:
(a) Any person who, as of August 1, 1978, has served a total of 8 or more
years as a supreme court justice or circuit judge; or
(b) Any person who has served 4 or more years as a judge or justice of
any court or courts of record and who was not defeated at the most recent time
he or she sought reelection to judicial office.
218. United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1982),petitionforcert.fled,
51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. June 10, 1982) (No. 82-265).
219. United States v. Raineri, No. 80-CR-29 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 5, 1982).
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VI.

RECALL

Recall is a device designed to make elected public officials continuously responsive to the electorate. States which
employ recall authorize the removal of public officials by an
adverse popular vote any time following a specified period
after the public official's term commences. The process begins with the preparation and circulation of a petition for
removal. The petition must be signed by a percentage of the
voters of the state or political subdivision in which the official holds office.220 In Wisconsin, if the petition meets the
constitutiona1221 and statutory 222 tests, a special election is
called.
Historians debate the date,22 3 but do not debate the content, of the fifth section of the Code of Hammurabi which
220. A. MACDONALD, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
362 (6th ed. 1960).
221. WIs. CONST. art. XIII, § 12 (1926, amended 1981):
The qualified electors of the state or of any county or of any congressional,
judicial or legislative district may petition for the recall of any elective officer
after the first year of the term for which he was elected, by filing a petition with
the officer with whom the petition for nomination to such office in the primary
election is filed, demanding the recall of such officer. Such petition shall be
signed by electors equal in number to at least twenty-five per cent of the vote
cast for the office of governor at the last preceding election, in the state, county
or district from which such officer is to be recalled. The officer with whom
such petition is filed shall call a special election to be held not less than forty
nor more than forty-five days from the filing of such petition. The officer
against whom such petition has been fied shall continue to perform the duties
of his office until the result of such special election shall have been officially
declared. Other candidates for such office may be nominated in the manner as
is provided by law in primary elections. The candidate who shall receive the
highest number of votes shall be deemed elected for the remainder of the term.
The name of the candidate against whom the recall petition is filed shall go on
the ticket unless he resigns within ten days after the filing of the petition. After
one such petition and special election, no further recall petition shall be fied
against the same officer during the term for which he was elected. This article
shall be self-executing and all of its provisions shall be treated as mandatory.
Laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation, but no law shall be enacted to
hamper, restrict or impair the right of recall.
222. Wis. STAT. § 9.10 (1979).
223. C. JOHNS, ANCIENT BABYLONIA 9 (1913), dates the Hammurabic Code
somewhere between 2150-2100 B.C. C. EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABIC CODE AND
THE SINAITIC LEGISLATION 16, 149 (1904), agrees with the date of 2150-2100 B.C.
However, E. WHITE, LEGAL ANIQUITIES 77 (1913), dates the Code at 2285 B.C. More
recent authorities are S. KRAMER, THE SUMERIANS 72 (1962), which states that Hammurabi lived at or about 1750 B.C., and L. COTTRELL, THE QUEST FOR SUMER 149

(1965), which state that he reigned for 43 years from 1728 to 1686 B.C.
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required that a judge be expelled from his office by a vote of
the populace for a mistake. 224 The Babylonians, it seems,
were unalterably opposed to rehearing trials for mistake.225
If an appeal were taken and a new trial mandated, recall of
the trial judge was directed.226
Lives From Plutarch227 tells us that the Athenian, Aristides, 228 known as Aristides the Just, often called upon by the
people to settle their disputes,229 was ostracized by a vote of
the populace. 230 Recall or ostracism required that the of-

fending public official leave the city for a ten-year period

within ten days after the popular vote. 23 1 The danger in this

form of recall was that many prominent people and otherwise powerful public officials were removed in this manner

for unpopular decisions, out of envy, or simply for becoming
too powerful, and not necessarily because they had committed some wrong.232 The citizens of Syracuse borrowed ostracism from the Athenians. They called it "petalism" because
the citizen votes for recall were cast on the petals of the
leaves of the olive tree. Those recalled were required to

leave the city for five years.3 3
In the early days of Rome, praetors (judges) were directly responsible to the general public for abuse of their
public trust, which was called perdnellio. They would be
tried in the forum of public sentiment (populijudico)and, if
224. C. EDWARDS, supra note 223, at 28, states that § 5 translates as follows:
If a judge has heard a case and given a decision, and delivered a written verdict, and if afterwards he can be disproved and that judge be convicted as the
cause of the misjudgment; then shall he pay 12 times the penalty awarded in
the case. In public assembly he shall be thrown from the seat of judgment; he
shall not return; and he shall not sit with the judges upon a case.
225. E. WHrrE, supra note 223, at 78-79.
226. Id at 78.
227. J. MCFARLAND, P. GRAVES & A. GRAvEs, LIvES FROM PLUTARCH (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Livas FROM PLUTARCH].
228. Aristides lived in Athens from 530-468 B.C. id at 21.
229. 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW xxvii (2d ed.
1899), states that at the time of Pericles, and even Demosthenes, there was a great
deal of law, but no class of persons answering to the title of judge or counselors.
LIvEs FROM PLUTARCH, supra note 227, at 23-27, states that Aristides frequently was
asked to referee disputes between private parties and that he was an army general.
230. E. WnHIE, supra note 223, at 82.
231. Id at 81.
232. Id at 81-82.
233. Id at 86-87.
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convicted, would be subject to banishment or death. 34 This
35
form of recall did not survive the formation of the empire.2
The jurisprudence of the empire makes no note of the recall
device in the Twelve Tables, Gaius' Institutes, the Rules of
Ulpian, the Opinions of Paulus, or the Institutes, Digests and
Code of Justinian.236
Our English forbears of the common-law tradition had
no recall provision. Since recall is essentially an electoral
political device, their system obviated its inclusion. From
the inception of the curia regis237 to the present judicial system, all judicial officers were appointed by the Crown and
are theoretically appointed by the Crown today. Since election to the office of judge is not the method used, the recall
device is unnecessary.
The forefathers of the United States, however, on disengaging from England, saw fit to include recall in the Articles
of Confederation. 238 During its sessions, the Continental
Congress took up the issue of recall. On May 29, 1787, at
the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph, delegate from Virginia, offered a proposal that the
members of the popularly elected branch of the national legislature be subject to recall. 239 The recall proposition was
short-lived and was excised without debate on a motion of
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina at a committee of the
whole meeting on June 12, 1787.240
Id at 87-88.
Id at 88.
S. ScoTr, THE CIVIL LAW 1-17 (1932).
Henry II formed the curia regis at Westminster in 1178. 2 F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 229, at 153-56.
238. Articles of Confederation art. V (dated 1778, but executed by its signators at
various dates through March 1, 1781):
For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United
States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature
of each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power reserved to each State, to recallits delegates,or
any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead, for
the remainder of the year. (emphasis added).
239. JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION KEPT BY JAMES MADISON 61 (E.
Scott ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]; 1 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20 (1937).
240. JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 239, at 159; 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 239, at 210.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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The issue lay dormant until the progressive political philosophy of reform swept across the United States at the turn
of the twentieth century. In the early 1900's, the progressive
movement's most famous demand was for initiative, referenda and recall. 241 Wisconsin, a premiere progressive state,
holds the distinction of being the first to adopt the direct primary,242 to require legislators to record roll call votes, 243 and
to create civil service,244 industrial, 245 insurance, 246 railroad 247 and tax commissions.2 4 8 While Wisconsin's movement wielded enormous influence in other states, it was itself
influenced by the populist reform movements in California
and Oregon. In 1908 Oregon was the first state to adopt recall as part of its reform movement.249 Wisconsin adopted a
recall statute for city officials in 1911.250 However, when
state, county, congressional, judicial or legislative recall was
proposed, battle was joined. Protagonists centered their arguments on the judicial field. Progressives argued that government, especially the judiciary with its long terms in office,
was controlled by special interests, and recall was the tool to
return control of the government to the people. Their opponents argued that, because judges are frequently called upon
to render seemingly unpopular decisions, an independent judiciary would be destroyed if its members continuously had
to gauge a decision's impact on an unenlightened and overzealous electorate. Despite the opposition of the American
and Wisconsin Bar Associations and a united state judiciary,251 the Wisconsin legislature presented a constitutional
referendum on recall of judges to the people in 1914, but it
241. B. MAXWELL, supra note 2, at 201.
242. Id at 196.
243. Id
244. Id at 75.
245. Id at 198.
246. Id at 197.
247. Id at 75.
248. Id at 199.
249. Id at 199-201; A. MACDONALD, supra note 220, at 362.
250. 1911 Wis. Laws ch. 635 (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. § 9.10(4)
(1979)).
251. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 360 (1950); Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 7, 1914, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Milwaukee Sentinel, Aug. 29, 1912, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
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was soundly defeated.252
Recall of all elected officials was finally adopted as an
amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution by a 1926 referendum of the people.253 This referendum had the same organized opposition, but it came too little and too late. This

time, the bar and the judiciary organized their opposition
campaign less than a week before the referendum vote.254
Even though the constitutional recall amendment was selfexecuting, an enabling statute was passed by the legislature

in 1933. 255 Wisconsin is one of thirteen states that now have
constitutional recall of elected officials. Six states except

judges from the recall provision.2s 6 Fifteen additional states
have the recall
process available only for local units of
257
government.
In the fifty-five years of this remedy's existence in Wisconsin, the fears of its opponents have not materialized as

far as any part of the electoral body politic is concerned. It
is an arduous task to implement recall. The petitioners have
sixty days to accumulate the electors' signatures which must
252. BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 241 (the statewide vote was
144,386 against and 81,628 for).
253. Wis. CONST. art. XIII, § 12 (1926, amended 1981). See supra note 221;
BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 241 (the statewide vote tally was 205,868
for and 201,125 against).
254. Milwaukee J., Oct. 29, 1926, § 1, at 1, col. I & at 8, col. 1; Milwaukee J., Oct.
25, 1926, § 2, at 1, cols. 1 & 7.
255. 1933 Wis. Laws § 1, ch. 44 (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. § 9.10
(1979)). See Wis. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 12 (1926, amended 1981). See supra note 221:
"This article shall be self-executing and all of its provisions shall be treated as
mandatory. Laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation, but no law shall be enacted to hamper, restrict, or impair the right of recall."
256. The states with recall are: ALASKA CONsT. art. XI, § 8; ARiz. CONST. art.
VIII; CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13-20; COLO. CONST. art. XXI; IDAHO CONST. art. VI,
§ 6; KAN. CoNsT. art. 4, § 3; LA. CONsT. art. X, § 26; MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 8; NEv.
CONsT. art. 2, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; OR. CONsT. art. II, § 18; WASH. CONST.
art. I, §§ 33, 34; Wis. CONsT. art. XIII, § 12.
Those that except judges from recall are Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan and Washington. THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 9, at 198.
257. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-817 (1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1901 (1980); MIN.
STAT. ANN. § 410.20 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 73.550, 74.200 & 75.350
(1952); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-16-601 (1981); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 23-2010, 14-209 &
19-613.01 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:81-6 (West Supp. 1982-1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 705.92 (Page 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 15.1-207 (1957).
THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supranote 9, at 198, also names Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Texas.
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amount to twenty-five percent of the previous gubernatorial
election tally in the recall district. The petitions are filed
with the clerk of the electoral district who certifies the petitions and the signatures within three days. Once certified,
the electoral district clerk must set a special election forty to
forty-five days after the date the petitions are filed.258 Given

this formidable task, there have been only eight recall procedures attempted against judges in this state, seven of which
can be verified. 59 One judge resigned; three sets of petitions
failed for insufficient signatures; two went to recall election
with the judges retaining their posts on the bench; and one
resulted in the recalled judge losing his post.
In January of 1948, recall petitions were circulated
against Jackson County Judge Harry M. Perry of Black
River Falls, Wisconsin. Newspaper accounts credit a businessmen's association with organizing the drive because of
claimed misappropriations by the judge of county welfare
funds.260 Judge Perry resigned from the county bench on
January 31, 1948.261

Petitions were also circulated for recall of Milwaukee
County Traffic Judge John E. Krueger on March 16, 1962,

for claimed erratic bench conduct.262 The petitions were

quickly withdrawn when the supreme court transferred
Krueger to small claims work, thus eliminating the necessity
for the recall action.263
Circuit Court Judge Ronald D. Keberle of Wausau
found himself subject to recall petitions in October of 1978.
A committee was registered with the state elections board to
promote the recall. The petitions were circulated in retalia258. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12, supra note 221; Wis. STAT. § 9.10(1)-(2) (1979).
259. In 1927, recall petitions were ifed in the Forest County Clerk's office at
Crandon, Wisconsin, against County Judge S.J. Conway. I Wis. BAR BULL. 1, 14
(1927). This writer personally interviewed the present county clerk, Dora James, who
could not verify from the Forest County records that recall petitions were filed, but
could verify that no election or special election for county judge occurred in Forest
County in 1927. BLUE BOOK (1923), supranote 19, at 314, notes that an S.J. Conway
was county clerk but later editions do not list any S.J. Conway as judge. BLUE BOOK
(1927), supra note 19, at 596, lists TJ. Conway as county judge as does BLUE BOOK
(1925), supra note 19, at 635, and BLUE BOOK (1931), supra note 19, at 409.
260. Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 23, 1948, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
261. BLUE BOOK (1948), supra note 19, at 487.
262. Milwaukee Sentinel, Mar. 16, 1962, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
263. Milwaukee Sentinel, Mar. 17, 1962, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
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tion for a court decision.2 64 However, no petitions were ever
filled with the county clerk. 65
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Christ T. Seraphim was the subject of a concerted effort of recall, claiming
his conduct on and off the bench was, at best, injudicious. 66
The circulation of petitions began on March 31, 1979.267 A
newspaper account stated that 79,000 signatures were

needed; the petitioners fell short by obtaining only 30,000.268
James W. Karch, Sauk County Circuit Court Judge from
Baraboo, was the subject of another short-lived recall at-

tempt. A losing, disgruntled businessman litigant attempted
a one-man campaign that failed for lack of public interest.269
Two thousand four hundred verified signatures (the required number being 1,436) were on petitions filed with, and
certified by, the Juneau County Clerk to force County Judge
William R. Curren into a special recall election set by the
clerk for November 1, 1977.270 Judge Curren had held office
since 1969. While the claimed problems with the judge allegedly had been smoldering for a long period, the spark for
the recall petition was the judge's alleged mishandling of a
drug-related case. 271 Judge Curren retained his judicial seat

in the winner-take-all recall election, outdistancing his nearest rival by 478 votes.272
During a May 25, 1977, dispositional hearing concerning
264. Milwaukee J., Oct. 28, 1978, § 2, at 13, col. 1.
265. Because of the lack of any further news reporting of this recall venture, on
March 2, 1981, the writer personally interviewed Judge Keberle who advised the
writer that no petitions with signatures were ever filed.
266. Milwaukee J., Apr. 19, 1979, § 2, at 12, col. 2.
267. Milwaukee Sentinel, May 16, 1979, § 2, at 12, col. 7.
268. Milwaukee J., July 30, 1979 § 1, at 1, col. 8.
269. This information was gleaned from verbal reports of judicial gossip. It was
verified when the writer personally interviewed Judge Karch on March 2, 1981.
270. Milwaukee Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 3.
271. Id
272. Milwaukee J., Nov. 2, 1977, § 1, at 22, col. 1. (The unofficial returns noted
that the vote tally was: William R. Curren with 3,293 votes; John Eakins with 2,819
votes; and Michael Solovey with 1,096 votes.) But see BLUE BooK (1981-1982), supra
note 19, at 244, 872-74.
The winner-take-all recall election provision in Wis. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 12 (1926)
has been amended to provide for a separate primary recall election when more than
one candidate files sufficient nomination papers in opposition to the incumbent, to be
followed by an election between the top two vote recipients in the primary election.
This amendment was ratified by a vote of the people on April 7, 1981, by a vote of
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a juvenile found delinquent for participating in a gang rape
which occurred inside a Madison high school, Judge Archie
Simonson made a comment that thejuvenile boy was "react366,635 in favor and 259,820 against. The present constitutional recall provision,
WiS. CONST. art. XHI, § 12 (1981), reads:
The qualified electors of the state, of any congressional, judicial or legislative district or of any county may petition for the recall of any incumbent
elective officer after the first year of the term for which the incumbent was
elected, by filing a petition with the filing officer with whom the nomination
petition to the office in the primary is filed, demanding the recall of the incumbent.
(1) The recall petition shall be signed by electors equalling at least
twenty-five percent of the vote cast for the office of governor at the last preceding election, in the state, county or district which the incumbent represents.
(2) The filing officer with whom the recall petition is filed shall call a
recall election for the Tuesday of the 6th week after the date of filing the petition or, if that Tuesday is a legal holiday, on the first day after that Tuesday
which is not a legal holiday.
(3) The incumbent shall continue to perform the duties of the office until
the recall election results are officially declared.
(4) Unless the incumbent declines within 10 days after the filing of the
petition, the incumbent shall without filing be deemed to have filed for the
recall election. Other candidates may file for the office in the manner provided
by law for special elections. For the purpose of conducting elections under this
section:
(a) When more than 2 persons compete for a non-partisan office, a
recall primary shall be held. The 2 persons receiving the highest number of
votes in the recall primary shall be the 2 candidates in the recall election, except that if any candidate receives a majority of the total number of votes cast
in the recall primary, that candidate shall assume the office for the remainder
of the term and a recall election shall not be held.
(b) For any partisan office, a recall primary shall be held for each
political party which is by law entitled to a separate ballot and from which
more than one candidate competes for the party's nomination in the recall
election. The person receiving the highest number of votes in the recall primary for each political party shall be that party's candidate in the recall election. Independent candidates and candidates representing political parties not
entitled by law to a separate ballot shall be shown on the ballot for the recall
election'only.
(c) When a recall primary is required, the date specified under sub. (2)
shall be the date of the recall primary and the recall election shall be held on
the Tuesday of the 4th week after the recall primary or, if that Tuesday is a
legal holiday, on the first day after that Tuesday which is not a legal holiday.
(5) The person who receives the highest number of votes in the recall
election shall be elected for the remainder of the term.
(6) After one such petition and recall election, no further recall petition
shall be filed against the same officer during the term for which he was elected.
(7) This section shall be self-executing and mandatory. Laws may be enacted to facilitate its operation but no law shall be enacted to hamper, restrict
or impair the right of recall.
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ing normally because of the permissiveness in the City [of
Madison] and [the] provocative clothing of women." He
then ordered the juvenile placed under close supervision in
the juvenile's home for one year.2 7 3 This and other personal

comments in the record gained Judge Simonson the vocal
enmity of both liberals and conservatives, with the liberals
claiming he was insensitive to the violence of rape because
rape is not a "normal reaction," 274 and the conservatives
claiming the disposition meted out was insufficient for the
crime. 27.5 Spearheaded by the National Organization for
Women, the Dane County Committee to Recall Judge Simonson was formed.276 A coalition of feminist groups was
joined by such diverse and politically unsophisticated units
as parents, teachers and school principals. Judge Simonson
subsequently exacerbated the situation by making public
statements asking "should we punish severely a 15 or 16 year
old who reacts. . normally" and stating that "women [are]
sex objects [though he did not say he approved of them being
such] and they should stop teasing men with provocative
clothing." 277 The local and state newspapers' almost unanimous protest of the judge's statements ultimately snowballed
to national editorial reprobations.2 7
The recall committee filed petitions containing 36,343
signatures (with 21,049 needed) on July 25, 1977.279 The
Dane County Clerk certified 35,319 of those and set a recall
election for September 7, requiring opponents' nomination
papers to be filed in the clerk's office no later than August 10
at 5 p.m. 280 Judge Simonson was defeated in the September
273. Milwaukee J., May 27, 1977, § 1, at 1,col. 6.
274. Milwaukee J., May 30, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
275. Milwaukee J., May 31, 1977, § 1, at 9, col. 5.
276. Milwaukee J., June 3, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
277. Milwaukee J., June 5, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
278. Milwaukee J., June 9, 1977, § 1, at 20, col. 1 & June 10, 1977, § 1, at 15, col.
5, contained editorials of the Milwaukee Journal, the Racine [Wisconsin] Journal
Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Green Bay [Wisconsin] Press Gazette and the
Valley News of Lebanon, New Hampshire.
279. Milwaukee Sentinel, July 29, 1977, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
280. Records of the certification and recall election are on file in the Dane
County, Wisconsin clerk's office under the date of June 28, 1977. See Wis. STAT.
§ 9.10(3)(c) (1979). The recalled official is automatically on the ballot unless he or she
resigns. Opposing candidates must file nomination papers under the usual procedure
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7 election.28 '
On December 22, 1981, Grant County Circuit Court
Judge William L. Reinecke sentenced one Ralph Snodgrass
to three years probation with the first ninety days to be
served in the Crawford County jail under the Wisconsin Huber Law,282 after conviction of the crime of first degree sexual assault.283 The victim was a five year old girl. Snodgrass
was acknowledged to be mentally retarded and had been living with the victim's mother prior to the incident. Apparently, Snodgrass and the mother had engaged in sexual
activity in the presence of the child. At the sentencing,
Judge Reinecke stated:
"I am satisfied that we have an unusual sexually promiscuous lady and that this man just did not know enough to
knock off her advances on that occasion and allowed the
contact to take place. Not initiated by him. I don't think it
was initiated by him. It was initiated by him and the
mother perhaps in having sexual contacts in view of that
young lady.
"But no way do I believe he initiated the sexual contact
that did take place and I would be quite satisfied that being
an unusual type lady that he is probably not going to come
into contact with another one
where it will ever occur
again. I don't think it will. ' 284
This statement caused outraged citizens to form a committee to commence recall petitions. They named themselves Citizens for Children. These supporters of the recall,
as in the Simonson case above, were concerned with the
judge's insensitivity in characterizing a five year old child as
being sexually promiscuous. Other supporters opposed the
of nomination for a primary election four weeks preceding the recall election to have
their names placed on the ballot of the special election.
281. Milwaukee J., Sept. 8, 1977, § 1, at 1, col 6, reports the unofficial vote tally
as follows: Moria Krueger, 27,244; Archie Simonson, 18,435; Daniel Moeser, 15,250;
William Bradford Smith, 8,446; Robert Burr, 5,190; and Worth S. Piper, 3,342.
282. Wis. STAT. § 56.08 (1979). The statute is named after the legislator who
authored the original, innovative proposal. It allows anyone sentenced to the county
jail to leave the jail during working hours and return at the work day's finish.
283. Wis. STAT. § 940.225(1) (1979) is a class B felony which carries a maximum
penalty of imprisonment not to exceed twenty years. See Wis. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b)
(1979).
284. Milwaukee J., Jan. 17, 1982, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
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leniency of the sentence. 285 Forty-one lawyers, approximately 95% of the profession in Grant County, signed a
statement supporting the judge and opposing the recall
movement.286 Despite the fact that the judge publicly apologized for the statement, the recall supporters continued their
effort to obtain the needed 3,798 signatures on their petitions.287 On March 26, 1982, petitions with 5,351 signatures
were filed with the state elections board in Madison,
Wisconsin.288

Pursuant to the Wisconsin Constitution and the enabling
statute, the elections board certified the sufficiency of the petitions and set the recall primary election for May 11,
290
1982.289 The judge immediately announced his candidacy.
Judge Reinecke survived the recall primary election,291
receiving a majority vote of the electorate and thereby
avoiding the need for a subsequent runoff election which
would otherwise have been required by the 1981 recall constitutional amendment.292 In the official vote canvass the
judge received two more votes and won the election by a
50.8% majority. 293 This did not end the judge's electoral
problems. One of his opponents demanded a recount in
which he questioned the handling of many of the nearly 200
absentee ballots cast.294 After the recount the state elections
commission confirmed the election results.295 That same opponent appealed to the circuit court for nullification of the
recount. Reserve Judge John A. Fiorenza of Milwaukee, sitting in the Grant County Circuit Court, ruled that there
were administrative mistakes in the election but that they
were not serious enough to void the election. He therefore
285. Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 12, 1982, § 2, at 10, col. 4.
286. Milwaukee J., Jan. 16, 1982, § 1, at 7, col. 3.
287. Milwaukee J., Jan. 25, 1982, § 2, at 3, coL 1.
288. Milwaukee J., March 27, 1982, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
289. Milwaukee J., April 1, 1982, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
290. Milwaukee J., April 2, 1982, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
291. Milwaukee Sentinel, May 12, 1982, § 1, at 4, col. 1. The unofficial election
returns show Judge Reinecke receiving 7,033 votes, James Dahlquist 6,051 and Norman Kvalheim 745.
292. WIs. CONST. art. XIII, § 12(4)(a); see supra text accompanying note 272.
293. Milwaukee J., May 14, 1982, § 1, at 12, col. 4.
294. Milwaukee J., May 19, 1982, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
295. Milwaukee J., May 26, 1982, § 1, at 15, coL I.
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dismissed the lawsuit. 296
Recall is essentially a political device, and because of the
swiftness of its occurrence there is, therefore, a paucity of
case law, at least in Wisconsin, on the subject. The case law
of Wisconsin addresses directly the recall of city officials and
the sufficiency of the petitions, but only peripherally the recall of state, county, congressional, judicial and legislative
officers. In the case of city recall petitions, courts will look to
the fact that the petition states the reasons for the recall, but
297
not to the correctness or the truth or falsity of the reasons,
and courts will look to the sufficiency of the number of signatures and the date of the signatures to see if they were
298
obtained within the statutory time limits prior to filing.
Judicial scrutiny is limited because statutory provisions relating to recall are "liberally interpreted in favor of the electorate, because power granted to remove certain elected
officials (city) through the recall procedure is political in nature, hence it is for the people and not the courts to determine the merits of the reasons stated in a recall petition." 299
The same is not true for state, county, congressional, judicial
or legislative recall petitions because neither the constitution
nor the °statutes require the petitioners to state any
3°
reasons.
Recall, in Wisconsin as elsewhere, has reached neither
the highest hopes of its altruistic originators, nor the darkest
prophecies of its cynical opponents. Wherever it has been
adopted, it has seldom been abandoned-the public is too
well satisfied with the sense of security which the existence
of recall conveys to permit it to be discarded.
296. Dahlquist v. Reinecke, No. 82-CV-272 (Grant County Cir. Ct. June 8, 1982).
297. Beckstrom v. Kornsi, 63 Wis. 2d.375, 382-86, 217 N.W.2d 283, 286-89
(1974).
298. State ex rel Baxter v. Beckley, 192 Wis. 367, 369-72, 212 N.W. 792, 793-94
(1927).
299. Mueller v. Jensen, 63 Wis. 2d 362, 374, 217 N.W.2d 277, 283 (1974).

300. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 12; Wis. STAT. § 9.10(1) & (2)(a); Beckstrom v.
Kornsi, 63 Wis. 2d 375, 381, 383, 217 N.W.2d 283, 287-88 (1974). It must be noted
that § 9.10(4), which deals with recall of municipal officers and all of its legislative
predecessors back to the original 1911 Wis. Laws ch. 635 (codified as amended at
Wis. STAT. § 9.10(4) (1979), required recall petitions of municipal officers to state

reasons for the recall.
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VII.

MANDATORY RETIREMENT

Mandatory retirement provisions are uniform dates arbitrarily selected by governments which decree when judicial
offices must be vacated. This device is employed to remove
disabled or elderly judges. Certainly the uniformity of compulsory retirement produces some waste of judicial talent. It
was unfortunate for New York to lose Chancellor James
Kent when he was forced off the bench at age sixty. Reciprocally, however, it was fortunate for the American legal
community because Kent spent the next twenty years writing
Kent's Commentaries.3°0 Other examples of long-lived and
illustrious service to their respective countries include Lord
Halsbury of England, who served that court system until he
was almost ninety and Oliver Wendell Holmes, who served
on the United States Supreme Court to the age of ninetythree.30 2 These men are, of course, the exceptions, for some

judges are too old at fifty. 30 3 It is important, therefore, to the
continuance and sustenance of a vigorous judiciary that an
arbitrary age balance be struck to retire mentally or physically disabled judges.
Forced retirement requires complementary pension systems. But like forced retirement provisions, pension systems
for judges are relatively new. England had no judicial pension until 1959 and since then has required high court judges
to retire at seventy-five. 30 4 Although our federal judiciary
has no mandatory retirement, it has a remarkably enlightcan resign, go on senior
ened pension system: federal judges
36

status 305 or resign for disability. 0
Most states of the union have adopted either constitutional 30 7 or statutory30 8 mandatory retirement for their judi301. J. KENT, COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN LAW (5th ed. 1840).

302. Shartel, supra note 21, at 137 n.18.
303. Id at 137.
304. 10 HALSBURY, supra note 27, § 867; see supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1976) provides that any judge or justice, after reaching
age 70, may resign at full pay with 10 years service. Section 371(b) provides that any
judge or justice after reaching age 65 with 15 years service can resign at full pay.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1976) provides that any disabled judge or justice with 10
years service can resign at full pay, and those with less than 10 years service are
entitled to half pay.
307. Those states that have constitutional mandatory retirement are: ALASKA
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ciary and have settled on arbitrary age limits between the
years seventy and seventy-five. The harshness of mandatory
retirement has been ameliorated in all states except Indiana,
by constitutional or statutory provisions that permit parttime continuance of judicial service after retirement. 30 9 Four
states, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana and New York,
have added cost of living automatic adjustment provisions to
their judicial retirement schemes.310
The first publicized mention of the problem of aged and
disabled judges in Wisconsin is found in a 1915 report311 to
the legislature on court reorganization. Wisconsin's Chief
Justice John B. Winslow was the chairman of the committee. 2 The assigned task of the committee was to find a way

for statutory reorganization of the courts but the report also
discussed the "delicate problem" of age taking its toll on the
members of the circuit court. The committee proposed a

constitutional mandatory retirement age of seventy and legCONST. art. IV, § 11; ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 39; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23; CONN.
CONST. art. 5, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8; HAwAII CONST. art. VI, § 3; LA. CONST.
art. V, § 23(B); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 19; Mo. CONST. art.

V, § 26; N.H. CONST. Pt. 2d. art. 78; N.J. CONST. art. VL § 6(3); N.Y. CONST. art. VL
§ 25(b); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6(c); OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a); PA. CONST. art. V,
§ 16(b); TEx. CONST. art. V, § 1(a); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 35; WASH. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3(a); Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 24; Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 5. The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico also has a constitutional mandatory retirement. P.R. CONST. art. V, § 10.
308. ALA. CODE § 12-18-7 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 22.25.010 (1976); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 22-902 (Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 75075 (West 1976); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-1502 (West Supp. 1978-1979); IDAHO CODE § 1-2007 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, § 23.71 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 33.2.1-5-1 (Bums 1975);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 605.24 (West Supp. 1982-1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2608
(Supp. 1980); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 5 (Supp. 1981-1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 490.025 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 19-5-504 (1981); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 24-708 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 135.57 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.314
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 16.1-4.1 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-7a-39 (1981); VA. CODE § 51.167 (1982);
Wis. STAT. § 41.11(2) (1979).
309. T. PYNE, JUDICIAL RETIREMENT PLANS 4-5 (1980).
310. Id
311. Report of the Joint Committee of the Legislature of Wisconsin on Investigation of the Organization of the System of Courts in Wisconsin (1915) [hereinafter
cited as Winslow].
312. Justice Winslow served as a circuit judge of the 1st Circuit of Wisconsin
from 1883 to 1891 and as a justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin from 1891 to
1920. 174 Wis. xxxii-viii (1922). He authored The Story ofa Great Court, supra note
56, and was a founder and incorporator of the American Judicature Society, along
with Herbert Harley, Albert Kales and Roscoe Pound. See infra notes 364-65.
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islation providing half pay after twenty years service.3

13

The

report was not heeded by the legislature, which took no steps
toward reorganizing the court system nor toward providing
judicial pensions.
This is not to say that there were no legislative overtures
proposing judicial retirement. In 1897 a bill was introduced
in the Wisconsin legislature calling for mandatory retirement without a pension. From 1907 to 1921 some form of
judicial retirement with pension benefits was before every
biannual legislative session. 4 Again in 1929, 1937 and 1949
proponents presented judicial retirement and pension legislation.1 5 In 1951 supreme court justices and circuit judges
were included in the state employees' retirement plan at
their option.31 6 Those who opted into the plan were required

to retire at age seventy. 1 7 Voluntary entry into the retirement system ceased by legislation in 1957, when all justices
and circuit judges were mandatorily included in the retirement plan and were required by statute to retire on reaching
the age of seventy.318 All of the state's county judges, except
those in Milwaukee County who were included in a Milwaukee County retirement plan, came into the retirement system
in 1962 and were required to retire at seventy. 1 9
The legislative opponents to any judicial entry into the
state employee retirement system argued throughout the period that these proposals ran counter to the constitutional
prohibition against extra compensation for incumbent
judges. But once the judicial pension mandatory retirement
plan was in place, no constitutional challenge was ever initiated. Two reasons can be given for the failure to challenge
the judicial retirement statute. First, no one really cared.
313. Winslow, supra note 311, at 7-8.
314. Comment, 4 Retirement Systemfor Judges and Justices in Wisconsin, 1950
Wis. L. Rav. 662, 663-64.
315. I1d at 664-65.
316. 1951 Wis. Laws ch. 475; Wis. STAT. § 66.901(5)(i) (1952) (currently codified
at Wis. STAT. § 41.02(14) (1979)).
317. Wis. STAT. §§ 66.901(5)(i) & 66.906(la) (1952) (currently codified at Wis.
STAT. §§ 41.02(14) & 41.11(2) (1979)).
318. 1957 Wis. Laws ch. 527; Wis. STAT. § 66.903(1)(a) (1957) (currently codified
at Wis. STAT. § 41.07 (1979)).
319. 1961 Wis. Laws ch. 642; Wis. STAT. § 66.89 (1962) (currently codified at
Wis. STAT. § 41.07(3) (1979)).
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Second, those who would have challenged the statute knew

that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had rebuffed challenges
to the constitutionality of the state teachers' retirement
plan.320 The court rejected the argument that the teachers'

pension plan was compensation for past services in violation
of the constitution by reasoning that the pension plan was
not extra compensation for past services but an inducement
for future services. It added that this was a valid legislative
objective because the state had an interest in having experienced teachers remain in their positions to stabilize and im-

prove the state educational system.321
Statutory mandatory retirement continued in Wisconsin

until the Blue Ribbon Committee's report of 1973,322 which
outlined a plan for reorganizing the court structure and in-

cluded a provision for constitutional mandatory judicial retirement at age seventy. This proposal was adopted by the

people's referendum 323 in 1977 with a resounding two-to-one
majority vote.324 The constitutional mandatory retirement
requirement adoption affected only the fourteen Milwaukee
County judges, 325 because all other judges were not only
320. State ex rel Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 326, 193 N.W. 499 (1923). Accord Slate v. Noll, 474 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1979), aj'd,444 U.S. 1107 (1980).
The majority opinion of this three-judge federal district court panel affirmed the constitutionality of the Wisconsin employee retirement fund requiring mandatory retirement of all employees at age 65.
321. Dudgeon v. Levitan, 181 Wis. 326, 339-45, 193 N.W. 499, 504-06 (1923).
322. Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization, Report to Governor
Patrick J. Lucey 124-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blue Ribbon Committee Report].
"Blue Ribbon Committee" is the name given to the committee by the Wisconsin media and employed throughout the committee's three-year existence. See also infra
note 389 and accompanying text.
323. Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, § 24:
(2) Unless assigned temporary service under subsection (3), no person
may serve as a supreme court justice or judge of a court of record beyond the
July 31 following the date on which such person attains that age, of not less
than 70 years, which the legislature may prescribe by law.
(3) A person who has served as a supreme court justice or judge of a court
of record may, as provided by law, serve as a judge of any court of record
except the supreme court on a temporary basis if assigned by the chief justice
of the supreme court.
See also Wis. STAT. § 41.11(2) (1979) which incorporates the compulsory language of
WIS. CONsT. art. VII, § 24(2).
324. BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 244. The vote in favor of
mandatory retirement was 506,207; the vote against was 244,170.
325. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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compelled to participate in the state retirement fund but
were also required by statute to retire at age seventy. The
Milwaukee County judges had been participants in the Milwaukee County retirement plan which had, at least at that
time, no mandatory retirement rule. These fourteen judges
continued in office after their seventieth birthdays but no
county judge in Milwaukee ever tried to be reelected after he
was over seventy.
Mandatory retirement methods are examples of legislative line drawing in which some people are classified in one
manner while others are not. State judges, whether elected
on partisan or nonpartisan ballots and whether subject to
noncompetitive retention ballots or serving on good behavior, have all been subjected to mandatory retirement at a
given age by either state constitution or statutes. This is generally in contrast to the situation of state legislators or chief
executives. Therefore, this situation has been a natural
breeding ground for challenges by judges on due process
and equal protection grounds. Facially, there is little, if any,
justification for setting the judiciary apart as a class from the
legislative and executive departments of government and arbitrarily concluding that at a given age judges are less capable of continuing to serve the people than are legislators or
executives.
The primary question is whether there is a legitimate
state interest in the mandatory retirement of judges as a
class. Central to the equal protection argument is whether
this age classification is subject to the litmus test of strict
scrutiny as a suspect class or as an interference with a fundamental right, or subject to the more relaxed rational relationship test to determine the legitimacy of the state's interest in
this constitutional or statutory mandatory retirement
scheme. A subissue of the equal protection argument is the
status of the various classes within the judicial branch itself.
This argument comes into play when, for example, appellate
judges are allowed to retire at a later age than are trial
judges of courts of general jurisdiction, or lower court
judges, or when the retirement method employed "grandfathers out" certain judges from mandatory retirement. Central to the due process debate is the validity of the
irrebuttable or conclusive presumption that judges, as a
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class, become unfit for office when, at the same age, other
governmental officeholders do not.326
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the
equal protection issues raised in challenges to mandatory retirement legislation. One case dealt with mandatory statutory retirement of state police officers 327 and another with
federal foreign service officers.328 In both cases the Supreme
Court determined that the legislatively drawn mandatory retirement age line involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right which would require application of the strict
scrutiny test.329 The Court determined in both cases that the
rational relationship test was applicable and held that the
state and the federal governments respectively had exhibited
a legitimate interest in mandatory retirement at the age imposed, and that such age limitation was rationally related to
achieving that objective.33 °
No case contesting judicial mandatory retirement has
reached the United States Supreme Court, but a handful of
cases have been litigated in the federal or state appellate
courts. 331 All of these courts have upheld the constitutionality of state constitutional or statutory age-related mandatory
retirement for judges. Those that have addressed the equal
protection issue (that is, the argument that judges are classified differently than are legislators and executives) have
stated that age is not a suspect category and that a judge's
interest in the job, even though the judge is elected, is not a
fundamental interest requiring strict scrutiny. All these
326. This author will not attempt an in-depth analysis of the various appellate
decisions that have dealt with mandatory retirement. That subject is better left to
treatises particularizing the subject matter. See Abramson, Compulsory Retirement,
the Constitution and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo. L. REv. 25 (1977).
327. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
328. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
329. Id at 96-97; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 31214 (1976).
330. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 103-06 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976).
331. Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1980); Trafelet v. Thompson,
594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d
431 (9th Cir. 1975); Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 215 P.2d 286 (1950); O'Neil v.
Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1978); Grinnell v. State, 121 N.H. 823, 435 A.2d 523
(1981); Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah 2d 277,480 P.2d 467 (1971); Aronstam v. Cashman,
132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974).
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courts have employed the rational relationship test, and all
have determined that the state has a legitimate interest in
establishing an age classification for mandatory retirement
for judges. Generally, the legitimate interest has been shown
by the state's need to weed out those judges who are disabled
at the age date; by the fact that some judges cannot handle
the rigors of the job as they age; and by the fact that such
methods replenish the judiciary by infusion of younger,
more vigorous judges.
The equal protection attacks have not rested solely on
the claimed differential treatment of age classification for
judges as opposed to legislators and executives. The equal
protection doctrine has been raised in class actions in which
citizens have joined as plaintiffs in the judges' actions. In
these lawsuits the added claim is the adverse effect upon the
voters' right to vote for the candidate of their choice. The
because it presents no
courts have rejected this argument
332
substantial federal question.

Another equal protection argument advanced challenges
those mandatory retirement plans which set up different age
classifications within the judiciary itself (for example,
mandatory retirement for supreme court justices at seventyfive with a lower mandatory retirement age for judges in the
trial courts). The state courts which have addressed this issue have determined that different age classifications within
333
the judicial class itself do not contravene equal protection.

At one time the United States Supreme Court held that a
state can show no legitimate interest in laws establishing irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions because such laws are
unconstitutionally violative of procedural due process
which, minimally, requires notice and hearing standards.334
332. Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
906 (1979); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Aronstam v.
Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 544-46, 325 A.2d 361, 365 (1974).
333. O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Mo. 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 25 Utah
2d 277, 289, 480 P.2d 467, 476 (1971).
334. Examples of the Supreme Court striking down such statutes are: Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (regulations requiring mandatory maternity leave); United States Dep't of Ag. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (regulations
denying food stamps to a household consisting of one or more persons over 18 who
had been claimed as a dependent within the preceding two years by taxpayers who
were themselves ineligible for food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)
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However, in the 1975 case of Weinberger v. Safi,3 " the

Court seemingly retreated from this rigid posture by restricting the applicability of the irrebuttable presumption approach. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, viewed
the wholesale extension of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine of Stanley v. Illinois,336 Vlandis v. Kline,3 3 7 and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur 338 as a legalistic
monstrosity that "would turn the doctrine of those cases into
a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent

with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. '339 Justice Rehnquist concluded that legislative bodies,
reasonably concerned with the possibility of abuse and reasonably desiring to avoid the abuse, can rationally conclude

both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against the abuse's occurrence and that the expense and
other difficulties of individual determination justifies the im-

position of a prophylactic rule.3 40 This less restrictive standard of review enabled a lower federal court to strike down

the mandatory presumption doctrine attack against a
mandatory judicial retirement statute enforced in
(statute mandating that any student who initially applied to attend a state college
from out of state could not, during the term of attendance at a state college, apply as a
resident of the state); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presuming the natural
father of an illegitimate child was unfit for custody of that child); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971) (statute presuming an uninsured motorist was negligent in an accident
and providing that the motorist's license be revoked unless he deposited a cash bond
for damages in the amount of the injured party's claimed damages, provisions the
statute did not require of insured motorists).
335. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In this case the Supreme Court
majority affirmed the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(5) (1976), which defined a qualified recipient widow for federal social security benefits as one who was married to the
deceased worker for more than nine months before the worker's death, and
§ 416(e)(2) (1976), which defined a qualified recipient stepdaughter for such benefits
who had been a stepdaughter for one year prior to the worker's death. The acknowledged purpose of the law was to prevent benefits to participants in sham marriages.
Id at 767. This decision denied the worker's widow social security benefits because
she was not married to the worker for nine months prior to his demise.
336. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
337. 412 U.S. 44 (1973).
338. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
339. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
340. Id at 777-78. The Court concluded that the duration-of-relation social security test meets this constitutional standard.
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Pennsylvania.341
It appears at this writing that constitutional and statutory
mandatory retirement requirements will withstand constitutional attack on either equal protection or due process
grounds. In most cases this arbitrary age limitation is harsh
m its application, but there can be little argument that the
various states have a legitimate permissible interest in establishing such classifications for the continuance of a healthy
vigorous judiciary. Though not essentially a populist issue,
the constitutional amendment approving mandatory retirement for Wisconsin's judiciary was a classic example of the
populist mood, for the proposal was adopted by better than a
two-thirds majority of the state's voters.
VIII.

342

ELECTION OF JUDGES

The elected judiciary is pure Americana. 3 It is the result of populist belief that judges, like other elected public
officials, should be responsive to the public. This accountability to the people is accomplished by electing judges to
stated terms of office.
The founders of this country rejected election of the judicial branch with little discussion. The only mention of popular election of the federal judiciary in the debates on the
framing of the United States Constitution is negative.3
Consequently all federal judges receive their appointments
from the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They hold office during good behavior. Most of the
founding states also adopted this common-law method and
did not elect their judiciary. Vermont is an exception to this
general rule. In its 1793 constitution, Vermont gave to the
341. Maimed v. Thomburg, 621 F.2d 565, 574-76 (3d Cir. 1980). Accord Trafelet
v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 629-30 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); O'Neil
v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761,766-67 (Mo. 1978); Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 54546, 325 A.2d 361, 365-66 (1974).
342. Historically, PART VIII, ELECTION OF JUDGES would follow PART V, CONVICTION OF A FELONY. Both are 1848 Wisconsin Constitutional remedies; however,
since election is an evolving area, it serves as a transition between the traditional
remedies and recent methods of judicial accountability.
343. Jacob, JudicialInsulation-Elections,Direct Particpation,and Public Aten-

tion to the Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 801, 801.
344. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 4, at 137. James Madison opposed the direct election
of members of the Senate and the judiciary. Id
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freemen of each county the liberty of choosing the judges of
inferior courts. 45 Vermont's scheme of electing lower court
judges was followed by Georgia in 1812 and Indiana in
1816.
After Jacksonian democracy came to the fore in the
1830's,346 a complete change took place in the method of selection and tenure of the judiciary in most state court systems. All but a few states abandoned the appointment
system that had become the settled practice of the rest of the
civilized world. They amended and wrote their constitutions
to provide for popular election of judges to hold office for a
short term of years. 47 The basic principle of Jacksonian democracy was the equality in fact of all people. This principle was translated into a variety of political reforms, among
them the notion that all public officials, including judges,
should be elected. 48 In 1832, Mississippi became the first
state to adopt popular election for all of its judiciary.3 49 New
York, in 1846, was the first former colony to change its constitution to allow election of the whole judicial body.
Four other former colonies, Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, also joined the movement from an appointed to an elected judiciary. By the time of the Civil
War, twenty-four of thirty-four states had established an
elected judiciary. Every new state, from Iowa in 1846 to Arizona in 1912, provided for an elected judiciary.351 In fact, as
new states were admitted into the Union, all adopted popular election for some or all judges until the admission of
Alaska in 1959.352
Wisconsin followed the mainstream of populist political
thought in providing for the election of its judiciary.353 The
345. VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 9 (1793).
346. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 194, at I11.
347. 5 R. POUND, supra note 36, at 418.
348. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE
NOMINATING PROCESS 9 (1974).
349. Id; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 194, at 111.
350. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 348, at 9.
351. P. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 3 (1980).
352. L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as IUDICIAL SELECTION].
353. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846, supra note

53,

19821

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

Wisconsin founders' reasons for this adoption are eloquently
stated in the convention's judiciary subcommittee report of
the 1846 convention. The committee laid down the axiom
that "the people are the source of all political power, and to
them should their officers and rulers be responsible for the
faithful discharge of their respective duties. 354 The report
objected to life appointments by the executive and legislature, for such appointments would render the judiciary de355
pendent upon these politicians and not upon the people.
It rejected the national government's adoption of England's
common-law system of an appointed judiciary because
"[tihere all judicial power is presumed to reside in the king
356 The populist ideal inherent in these deliberations
...
can best be measured by this statement from the report:
Now it is proposed to carry out these principles in the election of our judiciary, as well as other departments of government. And why not? Are not the people so competent
to choose in one case as the others, and are they not equally
interested to make wise and judicious selections? Why
prohibit the exercise of the elective franchise in a single department of government? If it be true, that all power resides in and should flow from the people, is it not true, not
only in the part, but in the whole? If false, let us discard the
principle entirely; let us at once proclaim to the world that
our political theory is a delusion; let us no longer seek to
cherish in the hearts of the down-trodden and oppressed
millions of Europe, the fond hope of freedom and equal
rights, a hope doomed to wither and perish like untimely
fruit. But for ourselves we have no such fears. We believe
the electors of Wisconsin will judiciously exercise the right
of suffrage, however liberally extended, and that they
ought to exercise it in the selection of all their officers
wherever practicable. 5 7
The committee report further alerted the convention to the
114-15; JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1848, supra note 18,
66-67. See supra note 11 for the present constitutional election mandate for all courts
of record in Wisconsin.
354. JOURNAL/WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1846, supra note 53,
at 108.
355. Id at 109.
356. .1d
357. Id at 110. This report was tendered to the convention on October 27, 1846.
Id at 104.
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problems inherent in partisan elections of judges, which
made judges submissive to political parties. The report proposed that judicial elections not be held within thirty days of
any general election.358 The committee concluded its arguments for an elected judiciary with a rather naive assumption that election of able, conscientious and learned judges
would foreclose those elected from rendering unjust decisions to secure reelection. 359 The proposed constitution did,

however, provide for appointments by the governor when in-

terim vacancies occurred. 360 These arguments won out in

both Wisconsin constitutional conventions without any serious opposition. The state has had a nonpartisan elected judiciary since its admission into the Union.
Dissatisfaction with an elected judiciary has been a cause
celebre of scholars, the American Judicature Society and the
American Bar Association (ABA) since early in the twentieth century. Resentment of political party control of judicial
candidates in New York in 1870 gave impetus to the movement.3 61

The leading spokesperson was Dean Roscoe

Pound, who addressed the 1906 ABA convention with his
paper, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice. 362 His chief complaint was that the

election of judges put courts into politics and thereby had
almost destroyed the traditional respect for the courts.363
The first bulletin of the American Judicature Society proposed discussions on the selection, retirement and discipline
of judges.364

Albert Kales, a founder of the society,

presented the so-called "merit selection plan" to replace par358. Id Section 9 of the proposed judicial article presented by this committee on
the organization and functions of the judiciary reads in part: "No election for judges,
or any single judge, shall be held within thirty days of any other general election."
Id at 115.
359. Id at 11.
360. Id at 115, § 9.
361. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 348, at 10; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
194, at 325-26.
362. 29 REP. ABA 395, 395-417 (1906) (reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 6-24
(1956)).
363. Id at 415; see also 5 R. POUND, supra note 36, at 420-23.
364. Harley, Concerning the American Judicature Society, An Attempt to Give a
Brie/History f a Unique Organizationand to ExplainIts Objectives, 20 J. AM. JUD.
Soc. 9 (1936).
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tisan and nonpartisan elections. 365 He set out "to devise a
method of judicial selection that would maximize the benefits and minimize the weaknesses of both the appointment
and elective processes. 366 In essence, he sought to preserve
the so-called "informed and intelligent choice," which is the
strongest feature of the appointment system, while retaining
ultimate voter control.367 The focal point of any merit selection plan is the creation of a nominating commission, appointed by the executive, made up of lawyers and
laypersons. The commission generates, screens and submits
a list of judicial nominees to the appointing executive who is
legally
or voluntarily bound to make a selection from the
list.368 The person chosen from the list is appointed and
serves for a period of time and then submits his name on a
noncompetitive ballot for retention.369
The proponents of merit selection and retention plans
wanted the two propositions to coexist and complement each
other. They did not, however, design retention election to
advance democratic principles. Rather they intended it to be
a sop to populists. Retention election was designed to provide judges with longer terms of tenure with only a modest
amount of accountability. Indeed, those who developed the
paradigm preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced to political realities and allowed the public an opportunity to remove judges in extreme cases. 370 These efforts bore first fruit
with the initiative referendum vote in Missouri in 1940.37
Since that time it appears that seven states have completely
3 72
adopted merit selection and tenure for all courts of record.
Thirty-one states have employed commissions to aid the
governor in selecting some or all of the judicial officers.3 7 3
365. Kales, Methods of Selecting andRetiringJudges, 11 J. AM.JUD. Soc. 133-55
(1927). This article is a reprint of the text of an address which Mr. Kales gave at the
meeting of the Minnesota Bar Association on August 20, 1914.
366. A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, supra note 348, at 11.
367. Id
368. Id at 12.
369. Id at 11.
370. S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENtION ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 65 (1980).
371. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29(a)-(g).
372. JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 352, at 18-30.
373. Id at 6.
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Twenty states employ retention elections for some or all of
their jurists.374
There have been sporadic attempts to initiate merit selection and tenure proposals in Wisconsin. At the Wisconsin
State Bar Association's 1934 convention, a committee on selection and tenure, noting the necessity of constitutional
change to accomplish this purpose, proposed such a change
from the nonpartisan electoral system. The proposal required that a judicial counsel consisting of the chief justice
of the supreme court, the deans of the two state law schools,
and seven attorneys not holding judicial office, propose candidates for a vacant judicial office to the governor; the governor was then to make his choice from the three named; the
candidate would be appointed to serve during good behavior, but every six years would be subject to a noncompetitive
retention election.375 The bar voted to study the matter further.376 The committee was continued in 1936377 and 1937378
until finally, in 1938, both the committee and its proposal
were abandoned for the following reason:
To conclude: Your committee has given a substantial
amount of study to the proposals that have been made
throughout the country on this very important subject, and
feels that if a change in our method of selecting or retaining judges is desirable, the plan of selection that we have
outlined, and the non-competitive re-election, would best
fit our needs and our traditions. We are not, however, fully
convinced that at the present juncture there is any crying
demand for a change in methods of selection in Wisconsin.
Thanks to our completely non-partisan judicial elections,
and to the conscientious manner in which our governors of
all parties have, in the main, made their judicial appointments in the past, the Wisconsin judicial system is not in
any dire need of change, however great the need may be in
certain other states. The question of the integration of the
bar in Wisconsin, which has an important bearing on the
weight which the bar can put behind any proposal, remains
an unsettled issue. Your committee therefore has
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, supra note 370, at 70-75 app. A.
Report of Committee on JudicialSelection, 24 Wis. B. REP. 36-43 (1934).
Id at 254.
Report of Committee on JudicialSelection, 26 Wis. B. REP. 82-86 (1936).
Report of Committee on JudicialSelection, 27 Wis. B. REP. 7-80 (1937).
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presented in this report its views as to what would be the
more desirable form in which to recast the system of judicial selection and tenure if a change were deemed imperative; but we do not recommend that the Association go on
record at this time beyond discussing the subject and directing this committee to give it continued study as it is
worked out in other states of the union which perhaps have
greater need to act as pioneers in the movement than has
the state of Wisconsin.J
In 1950, Thomas E. Fairchild, then the Wisconsin attorney general, later justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
subsequently chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, now a senior judge, collaborated in writing a wide ranging article addressing past
attempts and failures to amend the Wisconsin Constitution.380 Judge Fairchild addressed two state constitutional issues affecting the judiciary: the adoption of a Missouri plan
for merit selection and the need for a unified court. He said
that a merit selection plan was needed because an uneducated electorate leads to voter disinterest.38 '
In 1955 the Wisconsin State Bar Association sponsored a
bill in the Wisconsin Legislature, supporting the creation of
a merit selection commission. Assembly Bill 471 was postponed,382 reconsidered,383 passed 384 and then sent to the senate, which voted to nonconcur in its passage.385 In 1969 the
identical proposal was introduced as Assembly Bill 1163 at
the request of the Milwaukee Junior Bar Association. The
bill was assigned to the Assembly State Affairs Committee
which did nothing with the measure.386 On July 30, 1971, a
state senator introduced Senate Joint Resolution 82, calling
for a constitutional change that would create two separate
judicial selection commissions, one for the supreme court
379.
380.
201.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Report of Committee on JudicialSelection, 28 Wis. B. REP. 56-63 (1938).
Fairchild & Seibold, ConstitutionalRevisionin Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REv.
Id at 212-15.
A.J. 471, 72d Sess. at 1185-86 (1955).
Id at 1253.
Id at 1254.
S.J. 471 A., 72d Sess. at 1483 (1955).
A.J. 1163, 79th Sess. at 2829 (1969).
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and one for the circuit courts. 7 The author later amended
the proposal to add a third selection commission for county
courts. This appears to have been the senator's individual
effort. The measure was disposed of without any advance-ment by a sine die resolution in 1973.38
The most serious attempt to mandate merit selection for
the Wisconsin judiciary was advanced by the Citizens Study
Committee on Judicial Organization. This body was created
in 1971 by executive order of Governor Patrick J. Lucey to
establish a constitutional reorganization of the court system
in Wisconsin. 389 This "Blue Ribbon" Committee's3 9 0 report
to the governor proposed, among other constitutional
changes, merit selection and noncompetitive retention elections.39 ' This part of the committee's report was never
presented to or acted upon by the legislature because the
promoters realized that this proposal, in populist Wisconsin,
was a political albatross that might jeopardize the balance of
the constitutional changes sought. The other constitutional
changes proposed were for the creation of a unified court
system with complete administrative control in the supreme
court, an intermediate appellate court, a single level trial
court system, mandatory retirement for judges at age seventy, and judicial discipline in the form of reprimand, cenThe promoters of the
sure, suspension or removal.
constitutional package realized that the media throughout
the state were uniformly opposed to taking judges off the
ballot, that the legislature would probably give the merit selection and retention plan lip service at best, and that the
people's referendum voice would be resounding in its opposition. Since voting on this measure might jeopardize a positive vote on the other constitutional measures needed for
court reorganization in the state, the committee dropped the
merit selection and retention proposal like the proverbial
"hot potato." After legislative constitutional approval, the
other proposals were adopted by the people in resounding
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

SJ.J. Res. 82, 80th Sess. at 1503 (1971).
S.J. at 2294 (1973).
Exec. Order No. 13 (Apr. 23, 1971).
See supra note 322.
Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 322, at 124-27.
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referendum votes in the 1977 spring election.392
By a seventeen to sixteen vote on March 24, 1981, the
Board of Governors of the Wisconsin State Bar Association
endorsed a judicial merit selection and noncompetitive retention constitutional change. 93 Two responses in newspaper editorials, one supportive,3 94 and the other in
opposition,395 as well as the one vote majority maintained in
the Board of Governors, signified the deep division of Wisconsin partisans on the subject. The president of the Bar
sounded the clarion call for elimination of the nonpartisan
election of judges. He employed most of the time-honored
arguments to support this merit proposal: thirty-one states
have adopted some form of selection commission; the nonpartisan election system is, in practice, not really an election
system since fifty of the eighty-three supreme court justices,
past and present, or sixty percent of them, and about fifty
percent of the present circuit court judges in the state, were
initially appointed by the governor; the incumbency advantage is enormous, leading to few contested elections; the lack
of issues in a nonpartisan judicial election leads to the lack
of choice and voter disinterest; and judicial election contests
are expensive.396 To his list must be added another criticism
of both partisan and nonpartisan electoral systems: they do
not obtain the best qualified candidates because of the potential candidates' repugnance to facing the electorate.
At the heart of the debates over judicial selection is a
tension between the values of judicial accountability and judicial independence.397 Not enough empirical data is available to prove which is the best system for selection and
retention, but it appears that the partisan electoral form
achieves higher accountability than either the nonpartisan or
merit selection noncompetitive retention form. 98 Adhering
to the populist ideal, Wisconsin has demanded that its judi392. BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 244.
393. Milwaukee J., Mar. 25, 1981, § 2, at 5, col. 1.
394. Id, Apr. 22, 1981, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
395. Milwaukee Sentinel, Mar. 22, 1981, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
396. 54 Wis. B. BULL. No. 5 at 4-6 (May 1981).
397. P. Duaois, supra note 351, at 242.
398. Id at 145; Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv.
731, 778.
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ciary be independent but has required nonpartisan elections
as a curb on maladministration. It was the first state to
employ nonpartisan election of its judiciary to curb the sordidness of partisan political control. An electoral check on
the judiciary eliminates the need for the impeachment and
address methods of removal.399 It is not the purpose of this
article to measure the value of the various systems, one
against the other. The determination of which system best
provides the needed judicial independence coupled with the
needed accountability is left to those legal scholars who can
scientifically prove it. However, this writer is convinced that
before populist Wisconsin changes its nonpartisan system of
electing judges, such proof will have to meet the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, and even that might not be
enough.
IX.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In 1966 California constitutionally adopted a commission on judicial qualifications with trial and enforcement
powers.c ° Since that date all fifty of the states and the federal government have adopted some form of investigative
and trial procedure for both the disability and the discipline
of their respective judicial members for misconduct off and
on the bench.4° 1 Court reorganization and widespread reporting of judicial scandals4°2 were among the reasons such
procedures were adopted, but the primary reason was the
inadequacy of the traditional Anglo/American methods of
officeholder accountability (impeachment and address of the
legislature) coupled with the claimed inadequacy of the pure
399. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 194, at 325. This legal historian concludes that
"the advent of the elective principle, at least, made a contribution to the withering
away of impeachment."
400. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1966). A 1976 amendment changed the name to
Commission on Judicial Performance. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1976); see also CAL.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 8 (West Supp. 1981).
401. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
402. For examples of scandalous conduct, see W. BRAITHWAITE, supranote 22, at
3-8; R. WHEELER & A. LEViN, supra note 45, at 24-25. See also C. ASHMAN, THE
FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy 270-78 app. (1973). This book details the conduct
of 73 judges holding office between 1804 and 1973 whose conduct ranged from habitual intemperance to murder. For court reorganization as a cause, see R. WHEELER &
A. LEviN, supra note 45, at 25-26.
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American accountability methods (election and recall).
Prior to 1960 few academic articles addressed the problem 40of3
the ineffectiveness of these four methods of accountability.

Subsequently, a plethora of books, treatises and periodical

articles addressed this inadequacy.4 °4
Since the late 1930's there have been attempts at setting

up a system of federal judicial accountability short of impeachment. These sporadic congressional proposals increased in the late 1960's and the 1970's405 and finally

culminated in the adoption of the Judicial Council Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,4 06 which
provides that federal court of appeals judges, district judges,

magistrates and bankruptcy judges may be denied a
caseload assignment for a specified time, may be privately or
publicly censured or reprimanded, or may be certified as dis-

abled.40 7 This act provides three levels for handling complaints against judges: (1) the chief judge of the federal
circuit; (2) the individual federal circuit judicial councils;
and (3) the federal judicial conference on a standing com-

mittee created by it. Either the complainant or the affected
403. Eg., Brand, supra note 50; Miller, Discoline of Judges, 50 MICH. L. REv.
737 (1952); Moore, JudicialTrialand Removal ofFederalJudges; H.].A 146, 20 TEx.
L. REv. 352, 356 (1942); Comment, Removal ofFederalJudges:,A ProposedPlan, 31
ILL. L. REv. 631-35 (1931).
404. E.g., Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, JudicialRemoval in New York A
New Look, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 11 (1972); Comment, Removal and Discolne of
Judgesin Arkansas, 32 ARK. L. REv. 545, 550 (1978); Comment, JudicialDisc#olineDoes It Exist in Pennsylvania?,84 DICK. L. REv. 447, 449-51 (1980); Comment, The
Proceduresof JudicialDiscpline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190, 210 (1976); Comment, supra
note 125, at 566; Alabama Section, JudicialDisc#olineand Ethicsin Alabama, 31 ALA.
L. REv. 459, 461 (1980); ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL JUsTICE PosrrON PAPER 31

(Def. Res. Inst. Monograph No. 1, 1981). See also Defense Research Institute, An
Overview of a PositionPaper: Administration of CivilJustice, 23 FoR THE DEFENSE,
No. 3 at 13, 16 (1981).
405. S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNG. REc. 6220-24 (1969), was a measure to set up a commission on disabilities and tenure to remove corrupt, intemperate
and senile judges. S. 295, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S899 (1979), was a
proposal setting up a federal conduct and disability commission within the judiciary.
S. 522, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S1960 (1979), allowed for the various
circuit judicial council panels to investigate problems within the judicial family.
406. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035-241 (1980) amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 331,
332, 371,372 & 604 (effective Oct. 1, 1981). For a thorough explanation of the act, see
Neisser, The New FederalJudicialDisc#7lineAct: Some Questions CongressDidn'tAnswer, 65 JUDIcATURE 142-60 (1981).
407. 28 U.S.C. § 372(6)(b) (1976).
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judge can appeal, but finality is reached at the judicial conference level.4 °8 Confidentiality is imposed throughout the
procedures except for the order of the final tribunal 40 9 or on
forwarding material to the Congress of the United States for
impeachment proceedings.41 0
It remains to be seen whether the Act will be effective.

The main question is whether it can withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground that impeachment is the sole
form of censure of the members of the federal judiciary. For
years scholars have debated the issue of the exclusiveness of
the impeachment remedy and whether alternative methods
of accountability destroy the separation of powers doctrine
or chill judicial independence.411
Wisconsin's convoluted path to the creation of a discipli-

nary body separate from, and in addition to, its traditional
accountability methods of impeachment, address, election,
incompatibility, conviction of a felony and the newer
method of recall evolved over twenty-five years, beginning
with the Wisconsin Bar Association's adoption of the Ameri-

can Bar Association's (ABA's) Canons of Professional Ethics
for Lawyers.

The ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics for
Lawyers in 1908.412 It was not until 1924 that it adopted the

Canons of Judicial Ethics.413 The Wisconsin Bar Association

408. Id § 372(10) (1976).
409. Id § 372(15) (1976).
410. Id § 372(14) (1976).
411. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. There are those who claim
that under the "necessary and proper clause," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(18), Congress
has the right to pass laws which create a commission of conduct and establish the
mechanics of trying a judge within the court system for misprisions. See Shartel,
FederalJudges-Appointment,Suspension andRemoval-Some Possibilities,28 MICH.
L. REv. 870, 883, 892 (1930); Berger, supra note 28,passim.
Some scholars maintain that impeachment is the sole remedy. See Kaufman,
supra note 36, at 687-701; Kurland, The Constitution and Tenure ofFederalJudges:
Some Notesfrom History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1969); Otis, A ProposedTribunalIs it Constitutional?,7 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 3 (1938) (this article is a refutation of
Shartel's 1930 article).
412. The canons and the report of the ABA COMMITTEE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics is found at 31 REP. ABA 567 (1908); the discussion of and the voting on the
canons is found at 31 REP. ABA 55 (1908).
413. The ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics are found at 47 REP. ABA 760 (1924).
The discussion and voting on these canons is found at 47 REP. ABA 70-71 (1924). See
supra note 141.
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adopted the ABA canons of ethics for its members. However, because it was a voluntary association, it had no effective control over its own members or nonmembers of the
bar, much less over the state judiciary. On June 22, 1956,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the bar should be
integrated 414 and adopted rules for its organization. 415 State

Bar Rule 9 provided that the Canons of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association would govern the practice
of law in this state.4 16 Since judges were lawyers and were

members of the integrated bar, the various grievance committees were instructed to receive complaints against them,
to investigate the complaints and to make reports of their
investigation and recommendations to the Board of Bar

Governors.4 17 Because of this integration of bar and bench,
the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics were never adopted

in Wisconsin.
In 1956, however, at the request of the State Bar Association Board of Governors, the Wisconsin Supreme Court created a committee to draft a code of judicial ethics. 418 A code,
which covered both conduct and disability, was drafted by
the committee, presented to the supreme court and
414. In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956).
415. Id at vii-xxxvii.
416. Id at xx.
417. Id at xxii-xxiii; State Bar Rule 10 § 5. The supreme court entertained an
original petition and granted the request of the Dane County Bar Association for
disbarment of Ole A. Stolen, a superior court judge of Dane County. In re Stolen,
193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927). The judge borrowed money from three known
bootleggers and on occasion interceded in court matters on their behalf or on behalf
of members of their respective families. The judge resigned from the bench before
this original action was decided. Nevertheless the supreme court disbarred him because his offense was one against the administration of justice and brought courts into
disrepute. Id at 623, 214 N.W. at 386. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying
text; Comment, SuperintendingPower of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Financial
DisclosureRulefor Judges, 1977 Wis. L. Rnv. 1111, 1118. See also Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, supra note 404, at 29, which is highly critical of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court for not using disbarment as a method of eliminating judicial misconduct. The authors claim the justices were reluctant to employ disbarment because
they are elected, as are all Wisconsin judges, and they feared electoral reprisal, or they
did not act in such cases because the electoral process would take care of disciplining
errant judges. This writer challenges this criticism because there is simply no data to
support the conclusions reached in the article.
418. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 252-62a,
153 N.W.2d 873, 873-78 (1967), 155 N.W.2d 565 (1968). A copy of the bar association
resolution is found in the Wisconsin Supreme Court file.
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adopted.4 9 The code consisted of sixteen standards which

set forth significant qualities of an ideal judge42 ° and rulds of
conduct of sufficient gravity to warrant sanctions. 421
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was aware that in previous decisions it had limited its constitutionally authorized
power of "superintending and administrative authority over
inferior courts" 422 to the control of the course of ordinary
litigation and inferior courts, as exercised at common law by
the Court of King's Bench and by the use of writs specifically mentioned in the constitution. 423 This self-imposed

limitation of its superintending jurisdictional role eroded in
recent
years when the court adopted a code of judicial eth424
425
ics

and a code of professional responsibility for lawyers,
created an integrated bar,426 adopted rules of evidence 427 and

civil procedure, 428 and established administrative judicial
districts with chief judges. 429 The supreme court rejected its
prior decisional constraints and boldly stated that it promulgated the Code' '43of Judicial Ethics under its "inherent and
implied power.

0

419. Id
420. Id at 256-59, 153 N.W.2d at 875-76.
421. Id at 259-62a, 153 N.W.2d at 876-78. Cf E. THODE, SUpra note 142, at 7-32.
(Thode was the reporter of the ABA Special Committee on Standards of Judicial
Conduct which revised the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. The revised canons were
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on Aug. 16, 1972. 97 REP. ABA 556 (1972).
Any comparison between the Wisconsin standards and rules will demonstrate that
both the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics and the ABA Code with its canons and
commentaries cover the same ethical grounds with merely subject matter
juxtapositions).
422. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § I.

423. In re Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 433, 284 N.W. 42, 44 (1939); State ex rel McGovem v. Williams, 136 Wis. 1,4, 116 N.W. 225, 226 (1908); Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293,

299, 87 N.W. 1072, 1074 (1901); accord State ex re. Fourth Nat'l Bank v. Johnson,
103 Wis. 599, 614, 79 N.W. 1081, 1087 (1899); Attorney Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277,
277-90 [*317-33] (1853).
424. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d at 252-62a, 153
N.W.2d at 873-78.
425. 43 Wis. 2d ix-lxxvi-b (1969).

426. See supra notes 414-17 and accompanying text.
427. 59 Wis. 2d RI-R377 (1973); Wis. STAT. §§ 901.01-911.02 (1979).
428. 67 Wis. 2d 585-748 (1975); Wis. STAT. §§ 801.01-807.12 (1975).

429. 71 Wis. 2d xiii-xviii (1975); Wis. STAT. §§ 251.235-251.243 (1975). See Wis.
Sup. Ct. R. §§ 70.01-70.34 (1979).
430. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d at 254, 153

N.W.2d at 874.
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The code was implemented in 1970 by the creation of a
judicial commission made up of two circuit judges, two
county judges, two lawyers and three public members appointed for three-year terms by the Board of Circuit Judges,
the Board of County Judges, the state bar and the governor,
respectively. 431 The commission was a unitary, or singletiered, commission plan.432 The extent of and limits upon
the commission's authority were as follows:
The commission shall have power to receive complaints of
misconduct or disabilities of judges, make investigations
thereof, hold hearings thereon, subpoena witnesses and
take action relating thereto. Such action shall be on written findings of fact and written decision. In the case of no
merit, the decision shall so state. The commission shall
have the power to reprimand or censure a judge but shall
make recommendations to the supreme court with respect
to suspension, removal, or retirement of judges. All action
respecting reprimands and censures made by the commission may be reviewed by the supreme court on its own motion or upon petition of the interested judge.433
At this juncture the Wisconsin Supreme Court was anticipatory. While it had abandoned its previously determined limited inherent powers of superintending control, it now
adopted and implemented a code through a judicial commission with procedural rules.434 At the same time, the court
recognized that it had no power to suspend, remove or retire
431. In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d vii-viii (1972).
432. K. CoP.u & L. BERKSON, supra note 23, at 10-I1. Single-tiered commissions
are generally authorized to receive and review complaints against judges, to conduct
investigations, to commence formal hearings and to make a disciplinary recommendation to the state's highest court. See I. TEsrrOR & D. SINKS, supra note 145, at 3.
Forty-one jurisdictions have adopted this form of judicial commission plan. Four
commissions (New York, Kentucky, Nevada and the District of Columbia) go a step
further where the commission itself can impose disciplinary sanctions, including removal, subject to review by the jurisdiction's highest court. These commissions handle cases from the investigation through the formal hearing and recommendation of
disciplinary actions to the state supreme court. In most states the supreme court is
authorized to make an independent review of the case and to make a final disposition.
Recently the state of Washington constitutionally adopted a unitary commission
system making it the 42nd to do so. See 2 JuD. CONDUCT REP., supra note 145, at 4.
433. In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d vii, viii-ix
(1972).
434. In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 57 Wis. 2d vii-xv (1973).
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for disability any judicial officers.435
During the same period of time that the court was addressing the adoption of a code, a judicial commission and
the commission's rules, then-Governor Patrick J. Lucey had
issued an executive order 436 creating the Governor's Blue
Ribbon Committee,437 which was made up of forty law
professors, lawyers and prominent laymen from all fields of
endeavor. The governor's charge to this committee was to
investigate and report the necessity for and the methods of
reorganizing the Wisconsin court system's administration
and structure. Significantly, and in keeping with the populist ideal, there were no judges on the Blue Ribbon Committee. The committee divided itself into five subcommittees
which held well-advertised hearings throughout the state.
The report of the subcommittee on judicial performance
evaluation supported the Wisconsin Supreme Court's adoption of a code of judicial ethics, the form of the judicial commission and the commission's procedural rules.438 The
subcommittee, in discussing the problem of judicial conduct
and disability, noted that the disbarment procedure was severe and inflexible, that traditional constitutional impeachment, legislative address and recall of judicial officers had
proven equally ineffective for the redress of complaints
against judges, and that election of judges was not a viable
solution for eliminating judicial deadwood. 439 The subcommittee further reported the need for a constitutional amendment to empower the supreme court to suspend or remove
judges for either willful violations of the rules or physical
and mental disability. 440 It also proposed a constitutional

435. In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d vii, ix (1972).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the sanctions of removal and suspension set
forth in § 9 of the creation of the judicial commission "require constitutional amendment" and that retirement for disability as set forth in § 10 "assumes enabling legislation." Id at nn. * & **.
436. Exec. Order No. 13 (Apr. 23, 1971); see supra text accompanying note 390.
437. See supra note 322.
438. Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 322, at 127-35.
439. Id at 128. The Blue Ribbon Committee Report deals with the failure of
impeachment, address and recall as controls, id, and with the failure of elections as a
control, id at 120-24.
440. See supra notes 433 & 435 and accompanying text.
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amendment to effectuate suspension and removal. 441 The
judges' subcommittee report was adopted by the Blue Ribbon Committee in its report to the governor.
The report was universally supported by the media and
Governor Lucey. It was also well received by the legislature,

but the legislature did not make any formal constitutional
amendment proposals until the 1975 session. During that
session the legislature approved constitutional proposals for
a unified court system, an intermediate court of appeals,

court system disciplinary measures and mandatory judicial
retirement at age seventy. The 1977 legislature passed the
same resolutions for the second time,"4 and the electorate

approved the referendum by majority votes in the 1977

spring election. 443 Significantly, while the unified court system and the creation of the court of appeals received two-to-

one majority voter approval, the judicial disciplinary proposal garnered 78.9% of the total vote, and almost the same
44

majority approved mandatory retirement at age seventy. "

These proposals were effectuated by enabling legisla-

tion.445 However, true to Wisconsin's traditional populist
temper, the legislature decided that the court-created judicial
commission was too closely aligned with the judiciary and
441. Blue Ribbon Committee Report, supra note 322, at 131-32.
442. See supra note 392 and accompanying text. Two successive Wisconsin legislatures must approve constitutional amendments which must then be ratified by a
referendum of the electorate. WIs. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
443. BLUE BOOK (1981-1982), supra note 19, at 244. The constitutional disciplinary measures adopted in Wis. CONST. art. VI, § 11, read as follows:
Each justice or judge shall be subject to reprimand, censure, suspension,
removal for cause or for disability, by the supreme court pursuant to procedures established by the legislature by law. No justice or judge removed for
cause shall be eligible for reappointment or temporary service. This section is
alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal provided in sections 1 and 13 of this article and section 12 of article XIII.
444. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURT REFORM IN SEVEN STATES

87-103 (1980). Chapter 4, written by Professor Robert Martineau, is an excellent essay on the political environment that threaded the adoption of court reform and judicial accountability proposals in Wisconsin from earliest glimmerings through
referenda electorate approval to legislative enabling acts, to the implacement of the
system. A fair reading of Professor Martineau's interpretation readily exhibits that
the slow and ponderous movement was accomplished well within the parameters of
political activity in its purest form. In short, Jefferson and his peers would have been
proud.
445. 1977 Wis. Laws chs. 187 & 449.
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that the majority of its members should be nonlawyer citizens. The legislature created a separate judicial commis-

sion 446 with a separate budget. 447 This legislatively created

commission is a two-tiered commission. 44 The nine-member commission consists of five nonlawyers appointed by the

governor with senate consent, one court of appeals judge,
one trial judge and two members of the state bar appointed
by the supreme court. All members serve a three-year term
but may not serve more than two consecutive full terms. 449

The legislation authorized the commission to adopt procedural rules pursuant to the Wisconsin administrative rules'
451

provisions450 and, after organizing, the commission did so.
Because Wisconsin has had the successive experience of
two commission forms (the unitary, or single-level, system
followed by the two-tiered system), their respective procedures, accomplishments and relevant case law will be treated
individually, followed by a comparison of the commissions
themselves.
A.

Unitary JudicialCommission (19721977)452

1. Procedure

Under its general provisions this commission was authorized to interpret the judicial code in connection with its
cases. It was not authorized to give advisory opinions or to
446. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 499; Wis. Stat. §§ 757.81-.99 (1979).
447. Id; Wis. STAT. § 20.665 (1977). The former commission obtained its budget
through the supreme court sum sufficient budget.
448. I. TusITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 145, at 3. Nine states, including Wisconsin, have separated the investigative and adjudicative functions so that this disciplinary system consists of two tiers. One body, called a commission, board, council or
committee, receives and investigates complaints. If there exists probable cause for
disciplinary action or removal, that body presents the charges to a separate board or
court for adjudication.
449. Wis. STAT. § 757.83(1)(a) & (b) (1979).
450. Wis. STAT. § 757.83(3) (1979).
451. 8 Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§ JC 1-6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 JC Rules].
Activities of commissions such as these require confidentiality until a formal complaint or a disability petition is filed. Confidentiality is critical to protect a judge's
reputation from frivolous and unfounded charges and to protect the integrity of the
judicial system as a whole. It is also in the complainant's interest to be protected from
possible recrimination for filing the initial complaint before the commission. '
452. I. TEsITOR & D. SINKS, supra note 145, at 3; K. CORR & L. BERKSON, supra
note 23, at 10-1.
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function as an appellate court. The commission was required to accept complaints from any source. Confidentiality was imposed on all issues brought to the commission
until a formal complaint was served. Any action taken by
45 3
the commission required a majority vote of five members.
Complaints tendered to the commission could be treated
summarily by a finding of no probable cause. If the commission proceeded further it was to make an informal investigation and notify the judge against whom a complaint had
been made, giving the judge an opportunity to respond.
Then, if there was no probable cause to issue a formal complaint, the commission would order the complaint dismissed
and notify the complainant and the judge. The order had to
state the commission's reasons for the dismissal. This commission's order of dismissal upon a finding of no probable
cause could be reviewed by writ of certiorari to the supreme
court.454 If the commission determined the complaint had
merit, it filed a formal complaint.4 5
Institution of a formal proceeding marked the removal of
confidentiality. The complaint, as in civil proceedings, was
followed by the judge's formal answer along with his demurrers and affirmative defenses. Amendment of the pleadings
was allowed as was discovery.456 The commission could set
the hearing (the trial) before itself or a master (to be appointed by the supreme court). The rules of civil procedure
and evidentiary trial rights were preserved for the judge.45 7
The commission was required to file its findings of fact and
conclusions of law within twenty days of the hearing. The
master was required to make his findings of fact within
twenty days of receipt of the transcript of the hearing. Fifteen days after the master's findings were filed, provided
453. In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 57 Wis. 2d vii, viii-ix
(Rule 2) (1973).
454. Id at ix-x (Rule 3). The confidential records of the supreme court reveal
that certiorari was attempted on 12 occasions. Certiorari was denied eight times and
dismissed once. In another case the supreme court determined that the party asking
for the remedy was not aggrieved. Certiorari was granted once, requiring the commission to state reasons for the dismissal of the complaint. In another case the
supreme court remanded the matter to the commission for further deliberations.
455. Id
456. Id at x-xi (Rule 4).
457. Id at xii-xiii.
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there were no formal objections to those findings, the commission was required to file its conclusions of law.458
The commission could dismiss the complaint if it determined there was no merit, but its decision had to so state. It
had the power to reprimand or censure a judge but was to
make recommendations to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
with respect to suspension, removal or retirement. All reprimands and censures were subject to review by the supreme
on
its own motion or on motion of the affected
court 45
9
judge.
2. Accomplishments
In its five-year existence, the unitary commission received 280 complaints of alleged judicial misconduct or disability. Two hundred and five were summarily dismissed and
sixty-six were dismissed after a preliminary investigation.46 °
During that period eleven judges appeared before the commission at the preliminary or formal hearing stages, while
several responded in writing.461 Six formal complaints were
filed which resulted in three censures and two dismissals of
charges after hearings. One judge of a court of record and
one municipal judge resigned from their positions rather
than comply with the requirement of filing a financial report.4 62 In its sixth annual report to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court the commission broke down the sources of the original complaints (totalling 280)463 and the categories of the
complaints (totalling 332). 464 The commission concluded its
458. Id at xiii-xiv.
459. Id at xv (Rules 4 & 5). See supra notes 431-33 and accompanying text.
Note, however, that at this time the supreme court had acknowledged that it had no
power to suspend, remove or retire for disability. The court anticipated constitutional
court reorganization which would provide these powers.
460. WIS. JUD. COMM'N SIXTH ANN. REP. TO THE WIS. Sup. CT. 6 (1977).

Ninety-four percent of all complaints were dismissed at either the informal or formal
level.
461. Id at 8.
462. Id at 7.
463. Id at 8. Litigants, 183; citizens, friends or relatives of litigants, 38; attorneys, 27; public officials, 26; other organizations, 4; anonymous, 2; totalling 280.
464. Id at 7. Dissatisfied litigant, 120; conduct on the bench, 67; conduct off the
bench, 66; tardy decisions, 22; dissatisfied nonlitigant, 7; use of intoxicants, 7; practice
of law, 6; improper salary voucher, 5; relative practicing in court, 5; on corporate
board, 4; financial report matters, 4; election activities, 4; acted previously as counsel,
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final five-year assessment with the following statement:
Wisconsin would seem to be blessed with a fine judiciary. This is evidenced by the relatively small number of
complaints generated in this period of five years involving
a judiciary composed of approximately 450 members, who
are covered by the Code of Judicial Ethics. In this period
of time the formal complaints filed dealt with such matters
as (a) a difference of opinion as to the necessity of filing
financial reports; (b) a judge permitting one of his relatives
to practice in his court; (c) speaking to a jury in the jury
room following the acquittal of the defendant charged with
a criminal offense to determine how the jury had arrived at
its verdict; (d) allegedly speaking publicly about a case
which was coming up for trial; and (e) for practice of law.
Also indicative of the justification for complaints is the circumstance that 94% were dismissed summarily, or after
preliminary investigation, as being without basis for further action. Wisconsin should be proud of its judicial system. Most states cannot make such a claim.4 6
3.

Litigation

By an order dated June 28, 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court amended the Code of Judicial Ethics 466 to require all
the judges in the state to report respective financial holdings
of themselves, their spouses and legal dependents. The
mandatory report was to disclose only the assets and not
their specific dollar values.467 Judge Charles E. Kading refused to honor this "sunshine rule" in the financial report he
filed on March 5, 1974. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted this failure and directed the judicial commission to investigate. At the informal, confidential stage of its proceedings, the commission noted Judge Kading's failure to
3; racial discrimination, 2; failure to disqualify, 2; physical or mental infirmity, 2;
soliciting charitable funds, 2; conflict of interest, 2; corruption, 1; calendar backlog, 1;
totalling 332.
465. Id at 8-9. At this time there were approximately 200 judges of courts of
record made up of county and circuit judges and supreme court justices. Municipal
judges who do come under the purview of the code numbered about 250.
466. See supra note 418.
467. In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 63 Wis. 2d vii-viii (1974).
See Comment, supra note 417, at 1111.

MARQU ETTE LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 66:1

conform to the requirements of rule 17.468 Later it formally
determined this failure and filed a report with the supreme
court. The court ordered the judge to comply with the rule
or show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the
supreme court. Judge Kading formally responded that he
refused to disclose his assets on the grounds that rule 17 was
unconstitutional. The court ordered a hearing at which the
following issues were raised: (1) Did the court have the
power to adopt the Code of Judicial Ethics and to amend
that code to include mandatory financial disclosure under
rule 17?; (2) Was rule 17 an unconstitutionally overbroad intrusion into the private economic affairs of a judge?; (3) Was
rule 17 invalid as a legislative act?; (4) Did rule 17 establish
a prohibited additional qualification for office?; and (5) Was
rule 17 a fundamentally unfair deprivation of due
469
process?
The court held that it had the inherent power to adopt
measures, such as a code of judicial ethics and a rule of
mandatory financial disclosure, which were absolutely essential to the due administration of justice in the state. It
pointed out that the code regulated judicial conduct, such as
investments in enterprises that were likely to interfere with
the proper performance of a judge's official duties. 470 The
court rejected Judge Kading's argument that the court's supervisory power was limited.471 It determined that rule 17
was a reasonable regulation promulgated as a response to
compelling state need to maintain public confidence in the
judiciary, that such public confidence was crucial to the due
administration of justice in the state and that rule 17 was
well within
the scope of the court's inherent supervisory
472
powers.
The court rejected Judge Kading's argument that judges
have a fundamental constitutional right to economic privacy
468. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 514,235 N.W.2d 409,411,238 N.W.2d 63,239
N.W.2d 297 (1975).
469. Id at 513-15, 235 N.W.2d at 410-11.
470. Id at 518, 235 N.W.2d at 413.
471. Judge Kading advocated that the court return to its limited superintending
jurisdiction stand. See supra notes 422-23 and accompanying text.
472. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 523-25, 235 N.W.2d 409, 416, 238 N.W.2d 63,
239 N.W.2d 297 (1975).
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and that, therefore rule 17, was overbroad. The court noted
that judges are public officials by choice and that, as such,
their assets are legitimately subject to reasonable scrutiny
and exposure.473 The court went on to hold that even if a
fundamental right were involved under a rule requiring
financial disclosure by a judge, rule 17 would meet the rigid
strict scrutiny test applied to laws or rules impinging on
Judge Kading's claimed fundamental right to privacy because the state had compelling interests which could not be
achieved by a means less restrictive of constitutional freedom. The compelling state interests for imposition of a judicial conduct code with a financial disclosure requirement
were found to be: (1) assuring the honesty and impartiality
of state judges; (2) instilling confidence in the people in the
integrity and neutrality of their judges; and (3) informing the
public of the judges' economic interests which might present
a conflict of interest. Taken together, these public interests
far outweighted any public official's claim to be free from
compulsory disclosure.474 The court determined that overbreadth was avoided by the limitations in rule 17 which did
not require the listing of household furniture or fixtures, personal effects, automobiles or recreational equipment. Also,
the disclosure form did not require an appraisal of the dollar
value or the quantity of the assets listed.475
Relying on the inherent and supervisory power doctrine,
the court rejected Judge Kading's argument that a financial
disclosure rule had to be promulgated by the legislature.4 76
As for Judge Kading's argument that this disclosure rule was
unconstitutional on the basis that it was an "additional qualification for holding office," the court determined that he
had no standing to make this argument because he was a
county judge, an office for which there were no constitutional requirements.477 Even if he had been a circuit judge,
an office for which there were qualifications listed in the
473. Id at 525, 235 N.W.2d at 417.
474. Id at 527, 235 N.W.2d at 417-18.
475. Id at 528, 235 N.W.2d at 418.
476. Id at 531, 235 N.W.2d at 418-19. The legislature had previously adopted a
code of ethics for all state offices which exempted the state's judges from its provisions. Wis. STAT. § 19.42(8) (1975).
477. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 531-32, 235 N.W.2d at 420.
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state constitution, the code and disclosure requirements were
more accurately viewed as conditions which were ancillary
to, and not in addition to, conditions for the office of circuit
court judge set forth in the constitution. 478
Judge Kading's last argument was that rule 17 was fundamentally unfair because it deprived him of liberty or
property without due process. The court rejected this theory
on the ground that due process only required that he be
given prior notice and a hearing before the sanction emanating from a refusal to disclose assets required under rule 17
was imposed. The court found that before rule 17 could be
imposed on any judge there must be a hearing in the
supreme court and, further, that Judge Kading himself had
been given a full hearing before the judicial commission as
well as the present hearing before the supreme court. Thus,
the judge had been afforded due process by these procedures.479 Judge Kading was given twenty days to comply
and the court retained jurisdiction pending compliance or
noncompliance.
On rehearing in 1976, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the sanction of civil contempt was available to the court
for any judge's refusal to comply with the financial disclosure provision of rule 17 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. It
ordered Judge Kading to comply with the economic disclosure form for the year ending December 31, 1974, or be subject to reprimand or censure. The court recognized that
Judge Kading was serious and conscientious in his opposition to this code requirement and, therefore, did not choose
to hold him in civil contempt at that time. The form, properly showing assets, was due twenty days after the rehearing
order.48o
On March 1, 1976, in a per curiam decision, the court
severely reprimanded Judge Kading, but chose not to find
him in contempt because this case was a good faith test of
rule 17 of the Code of Judicial Ethics. However, it again
ordered Judge Kading to comply with the code requirement
in his annual financial disclosure form due on March 15,
478. Id
479. Id at 532-33, 235 N.W.2d at 420-21.
480. Id at 543b-43c, 238 N.W.2d at 63-64.
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1976, and advised him that if he failed to do so he exposed
himself to being held in contempt of court.48 '
In a November 30, 1976, per curiam decision, the
supreme court noted that Judge Kading failed to file the full
financial disclosure statement of his 1975 assets required to
be filed by rule 17 by March 15, 1976, and the formerly ordered disclosure of his 1974 assets. The court refused to hear
his equal protection and due process arguments because the
court had disposed of them in the previous case. The court
also rejected Judge Kading's new argument that to be held
for contempt for his sincerity in refusing to comply with the
court's prior mandate amounted to his removal or suspension from office which, at that time, was beyond the supreme
court's power. It further rejected his argument that use of
the court's contempt power would amount to his removal or
suspension from office. The court noted that if Judge Kading chose to resign or be held in contempt rather than disclose his assets, either result was due to his acts, not the
court's. 482 Finally, the court rejected his new argument that
rule 17 was an ex post facto law and thereby denied him due
process. The court stated that the ex post facto argument
essentially was a due process argument and it had already
ruled on that issue.483 The court found Judge Kading in
contempt and ordered that if he did not file the required
financial disclosure form within twenty days of the court's
decision, he would be fined $150 and $50 for each day thereafter that he failed to comply. 48 4 Judge Kading resigned
before paying any fine.
Additional litigation included an original action commenced in the supreme court seeking declaratory relief to
determine whether the Wisconsin open-to-the-public meeting law was applicable to the supreme court created judicial
commission. 485 The court reiterated its inherent supervisory
481. Id at 543f-44, 239 N.W.2d at 297.
482. In re Kading, 74 Wis. 2d 405, 409, 246 N.W.2d 903, 905 (1976).
483. Id at 409-10, 246 N.W.2d at 905-06.
484. id at 412, 246 N.W.2d at 907.
485. Wis. STAT. § 66.77 (1973) (open meetings of governmental bodies), repealed
and recreated by 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 426 (current version at Wis. STAT. § 19.98
(1975)).
It must be noted that the present judicial commission came into being in July,
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control powers doctrine and stated that the court's power in
creating the Code of Judicial Ethics, the judicial commission
and the commission's procedural rules was exclusive; moreover, the state's open meeting laws were not applicable to the
commission's activities.486 The court concluded that even if
the state's open-to-the-public meeting law policy did apply
to the commission's procedural activities, that policy was
complied with in this case.487
The final litigation was a case in which tbe commission,
after a master appointed by the supreme court made his
findings of fact, determined as its conclusion of law that a
judge violated rule 4 of the code of ethics when he engaged
in the practice of law.488 The judge had assisted one Dougherty in drafting contracts. The commission censured the
judge. On the judge's appeal of the commission's sanction of
censure, the supreme court noted that the rule did not require that the judge obtain financial gain as an element of
the rule violation.489 It affirmed the commission's conclusion
of law that the judge had violated the code's prohibition
law, but modified the censure to a
against practicing
490
reprimand.
On appeal, the judge advanced two important issues. He
maintained that the commission did not have sufficient evidence before it at the informal stage to make a probable
cause determination to call for a formal hearing. The court
responded to this argument by stating that judicial disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal in nature, but
are inquiries, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish
the individual but to maintain the integrity of the judici1978, and must follow the mandate of the state open meeting laws under Wis. STAT.
§ 19.81-.98 (1979) because it was created by the legislature. See supra notes 445-47
and accompanying text.
486. State exrel Lynch v. Dancey, 71 Wis. 2d 287, 289-96, 238 N.W.2d 81, 82-86
(1976).
487. Id at 296-98, 238 N.W.2d at 86-87. See Wis. STAT. § 66.77(4)(b) & (e)
(1975).
488. In re Van Susteren, 82 Wis. 2d 307, 309, 262 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1978); In re
Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 260, 153 N.W.2d 873, 877,
155 N.W.2d 565 (1967) (Rule 4: "A judge shall not engage in the practice of law.").
489. In re Van Susteren, 82 Wis. 2d 307, 320, 262 N.W.2d 133, 140 (1978).
490. Id at 321, 262 N.W.2d at 140.
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ary.491 It ruled that the commission had to determine the
sufficiency of evidence at the informal stage according to the
standard a judge employs in a preliminary hearing in a criminal case: "[A criminal] preliminary hearing must establish
to a reasonable probability that a crime has been committed
and that the defendant had probably committed it."4 92 That
standard is modified to comport with the commission's preliminary stages of investigation into alleged judicial improprieties. The modified standard requires the commission, at
the informal stage, "to determine to a reasonable certainty
the probability that a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics
that the judge under
has been committed and the probability
'493
investigation has committed it."

The judge also contended that the commission committed prejudicial error when it denied him discovery of the
minutes of the commission's meeting during which it determined the existence of probable cause sufficient to warrant
instituting a preliminary investigation, the minutes of the
meeting when it decided to issue a formal complaint, and the
names of any persons, not members of the commission, who
attended those meetings. The commission had complied
with all other discovery requests but refused to divulge this
information.494 The court held that a judge is entitled to limited discovery under procedural rule 4.495 However, a judge

was not allowed discovery of the minutes of the commission's meetings or the names of the people attending those
meetings because that material and those names were confidential pursuant to rule 2.496

This determination appears to be circular reasoning. To
avoid the circularity problem the court noted that the minutes of the meetings addressed in this argument on appeal
were not in the record. It stated that if the issue were properly raised in other circumstances, when the propriety of the
491. Id at 311, 262 N.W.2d at 136.
492. Id The court cited Vigil v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 133, 141,250 N.W.2d 378, 383
(1976).
493. In re Van Susteren, 82 Wis. 2d 307, 311-12, 262 N.W.2d 133, 136 (1978).
494. Id at 312-13, 262 N.W.2d at 137.
495. Id at 313, 262 N.W.2d at 137. See In re Promulgation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 57 Wis. 2d vii, xi-xii (Rule 4(2)) (1973).
496. Id at viii-ix (Rule 2(2)).
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commission's informal proceedings were at issue, those
materials would have to be available to the supreme court on
appeal and review.497
B. Two-Tiered Judicial Commission 498
1. Procedure
The legislatively created judicial commission, in exist4 99
ence since 1978, must investigate any judges' misconduct
or disability.c It has the power to subpoena witnesses and
documents and may require a judge under investigation for
disability to submit to a medical examination. The commission may notify the judge of its investigation. Before finding
probable cause of misconduct or disability, the commission
is required to notify the judge of the substance of a complaint and afford him a reasonable opportunity to respond.
On finding probable cause of misconduct or disability by a
majority vote of the members present, the commission files a
complaint (misconduct) or a petition (disability) with the
supreme court. The commission prosecutes all complaints
and the procedures applicable to civil actions apply to all
proceedings.50 1 Before the complaint or petition is fied, the
commission has the choice of two forums, a six-person jury
requiring a five-sixths vote on all jury questions, presided
over by a court of appeals judge chosen by the chief judge of
the court of appeals, or a panel of three court of appeals
judges chosen by the chief judge. 2 After the complaint or
petition is fied in the supreme court and the commission
497. Id
498. See supra notes 448-51 and accompanying text.
499. Wis. STAT. § 757.85(1) (1979). Wis. STAT. § 757.81(4) defines misconduct as
(a) a wilful violation of the code of judicial ethics; (b) a wilful or persistent failure to
perform official duties; (c) habitual intemperance, due to consumption of intoxicating
beverages or dangerous drugs; and (d) conviction of a felony.
500. Wis. STAT. § 757.81(1) (1979). There are two definitions of disability: temporary, Wis. STAT. § 757.81(7), and permanent, Wis. STAT. § 757.81(6). Generally,
disability means a physical or mental incapacity which impairs a judge's ability to
substantially perform the duties of the office. Temporary disability is one which incapacitates or which is likely to persist for one year for a judge or for six months for a
supreme court justice.
501. Wis. STAT. § 757.85 (1979). See 1979 JC Rules, upra note 451, at 7-9, Rules
4.01-.07 (concerning misconduct); id at 11-13, Rules 5.01-.07 (concerning disability).
502. Wis. STAT. § 757.87 (1979).
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chooses the type of forum, confidentiality ceases.5 0 3 Following the filing of a formal complaint or petition, the supreme
court may suspend a judge pending final determination of
the proceedings. 5°
A public hearing is held in the county in which the judge
resides unless there is a request for change of venue. The
commission, as prosecutor, must prove the allegations in the
complaint or petition to a reasonable certainty by evidence
that is clear, satisfactory and convincing. If the panel forum
is employed, the panel must file with the supreme court findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations regarding appropriate discipline for misconduct or appropriate
action for disability. If the forum is a jury hearing, the judge
must instruct the jury regarding the appropriate law concerning misconduct or disability. The hearing judge must
file the jury verdict and his or her own recommendations
regarding appropriate discipline for misconduct or action for
disability with the supreme court.5 0 5 The supreme court then

reviews the findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations as determined by the hearing forum and determines appropriate discipline in cases 50of6 misconduct and
appropriate action in cases of disability.
2. Accomplishments
It is unfortunate that the legislatively created commission
has not, to date, made any annual public statement of its
caseload or the results of its activities with that caseload, as
did the previous supreme court commission. An annual
public report would make the judges in the state aware of
the general sources and categories of complaints and their
disposition. Knowledge of the sources and categories of
complaints would, in all probability, serve as an excellent
educational device for judges and would apprise them of the
general citizenry's reaction to their on and off the bench activities. Further, because the commission is itself a public
503.
504.
505.
506.

Id § 757.93. See 1979 JC Rules, supra note 451, at 5, Rule 3.01.
Wis. STAT. § 757.95.
Id § 757.89.
Id § 757.91.
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body accountable to the body politic, an annual report is
necessary to ensure the commission's integrity.
There is no doubt that the present commission has been
more active than its predecessor. This is due in part to the
well-published fanfare of its creation from the Blue Ribbon
Committee proposals through the period of constitutional
adoption by the referendum of the people to the legislative
acts defining its statutory parameters. It is also due to the
media notoriety of the publicly determined cases which
arose from the commission's investigations and
deliberations.
The only public source of the post-1978 commission's activities is a 1981 national report of all the country's judicial
commissions. °7 This report states that in 1980 the Wisconsin Judicial Commission received 273 complaints, disposed
of 200 summarily and disposed of 68 cases after investigation. One judge retired before charges were filed, one was
suspended from office, one was removed, and two public
cases were still pending at the time of the 1980 report.
This report appears to be misleading in two respects.
The report exhibits that the Wisconsin commission receives
more complaints than the separate California, Florida, Illinois or Ohio commissions. 50 8 These states have a much
greater population than does Wisconsin. It follows that they
have many more judges. It seems improbable that Wisconsin, with its lesser population and fewer judges, would generate more complaints. The other misleading feature of the
report is that the 273 complaints numbered in the report include requests from judges seeking some type of advisory
opinion from the Wisconsin commission. These requests
from judges should not be included as complaints.'0 9
The report states that 200 cases were disposed of summa507. See 3 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 1, 2-3 (1981). That report follows this article as
APPENDIX

A.

508. Id
509. This writer is now and has been a member of the Wisconsin Judicial Commission since its 1978 inception. On receipt of 3 JUD. CONDUCT REp. (1981), supra
note 507, this writer questioned the judicial commission staff and determined that
some of the 273 complaints were actually individual judges' requests for advisory
opinions concerning their activities. As a policy matter, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission does not issue advisory opinions. If a judge does request an advisory opinion,
and if the problem is clearly articulated in the request, the commission staff will direct
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rily. These cases include judicial requests for advisory opin-

ions, complaints that are actually appellate matters in which
the commission has no jurisdiction,510 unfounded complaints
and complaints that are clearly intended to harass or embarrass a sitting judge. The sixty-eight complaints which were
investigated by the whole commission were cases that appeared, at first blush, to have merit. On closer investigation
and scrutiny the commission found all but five of them to be
without merit since no probable cause existed for either mis-

conduct or diability 111 In five cases the commission found

that the complaints had merit but that the judges' conduct
under consideration amounted to only minor rule violations
or minor failures to perform official duties. These allegations were dismissed with private admonitions to the judges

that such conduct constituted violations or failures to properly perform their duties and that the conduct should be cor-

rected in the future.5

2

The complainants received dismissal

orders with the private admonitions. This device is usually
employed after the judge has been requested to respond to
an allegation and make a response personally or in writing.

by making a perThe judge usually admits the wrong done
51 3
sonal appearance or written response.
responses to the judge to either the standard or the rule the judge should look at for
his answer.
510. 1979 JC Rules, supra note 451, at 6, Rule 3.07 (commission not to act as
appellate court). The commission is not allowed to function as an appellate court to
review the decisions of a court or judge or to exercise superintending or administrative control over determinations of courts or judges.
511. Id at 8 & 12, Rules 4.07(l)(b) & 5.07(l)(b).
512. Id at 8,Rule 4.07(l)(c) & (d). The administrative rules provide for private
admonitions to a judge.
513. There is no constitutional or statutory authority for the Wisconsin Judicial
Commission to privately reprimand a judge. The commission adopted this procedure
to prevent needless public humiliation of a judge for a minor violation of a rule or
standard and to save the untoward costs of a formal hearing and ultimate supreme
court sanction. The validity of this sanction is questionable. Its use is subject to
abuse by a commission (e.g., hiding major judicial misconduct incidents with private
sanctions). More importantly, its use may deprive an innocent judge of*the opportunity to be exonerated from an unfounded allegation of misconduct.
This issue is discussed in Gillis & Feldman, Michigan's UnitarySystem of Judicial
Discoline: A Comparison With Illinois' Two-Tier Approach, 54 Cnu.-]KENT L. REv.
117,132-34 (1977) (Michigan's commission's rule of private sanction has proven successful over the years, has saved time and money and has resulted in most judges
responding to save public embarrassment, but there is danger of abuse by a commission and of foreclosing due process adversary rights); Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

The national report also notes that one Wisconsin judge
retired before formal charges were filed. Again this report is
not accurate. The judge was actually a retired judge serving
as a reserve judge on a temporary basis. He ceased being a
temporary reserve judge and the commission decided that
there was no need to pursue the matter. The allegation was
dismissed after the judge advised the commission of his
complete cessation of any judicial function. 14
3.

Litigation

As mentioned earlier,51 5 the conviction of Circuit Judge
Alex J. Raineri of federal felony charges, automatically recommoving him from office, was a direct result of the new516
mission's investigation into his off-the-bench conduct.
Efforts in 1979 to recall Milwaukee County Circuit Court
Judge Christ T. Seraphim met with failure,5 1 7 and the only
attempt at address of the legislature in Wisconsin's history
was lodged against him in 1980.518 After investigation and
presentment of allegations to the judge and after he filed his
responses with the judicial commission, the commission
found that there was probable cause that the judge violated
the code of judicial conduct. Formal charges to the supreme
court were proffered with a request that the hearing be had
before a panel of three appellate judges. The panel was
formed, held two status conferences and set the hearing for
February 25, 1980.
Judge Seraphim, in the interim, sued the judicial commission in a federal 1983519 action to enjoin the panel hearing, alleging that the specific code of ethics rules he was
charged with having violated and the statutes creating the
judicial commission were unconstitutional because they
Tier" JudicialDisc#olinarySystem Five Years and Counting, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV.
69, 93-94 (1977) (opposing "station-house" adjustments or prosecutorial discretion
unless a due process advisory system is adopted for these occasions). See also Cohn,
Comparing One and Two-Tier Systems, 63 JUDICATURE 244, 247-48 (1979).
514. These statements and conclusions are from the author's personal knowledge
as a member of the Wisconsin Judicial Commission since 1978. See supra note 509.
515. See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
519. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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were vague and overbroad. In an amended complaint the
judge charged that the statutes creating the commission and

its powers were an improper intrusion by the legislature into
the province of the state judiciary. The federal district court
520
denied the temporary injunction and dismissed the action.
The court employed the Younger v. Harris521 abstention doctrine because the state interest in the pending determination
of judicial misconduct was important and because the state
judge, Seraphim, had made an insufficient showing that the
state case would come under the Younger exceptions. The
court held that the judge could raise the constitutional issues
brought in the federal case in the state proceedings, that the

judge made no showing that the state case was brought in
bad faith, and that the challenged statutes were not so patently unconstitutional as to justify immediate federal court

intervention.522
After the hearing, the panel rendered findings of fact and
conclusions of law determining that Judge Seraphim engaged in misconduct because he willfully violated rules 8,
11, 15, 16 and 17(e) of the Code of Judicial Ethics. 23 The
panel recommended to the supreme court that the judge be
removed from office or, alternatively, be suspended from office without pay for not less than three years.524 The judge
argued to the supreme court that the panel erroneously con-

520. Seraphim v. Judicial Conduct Panel, 483 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
521. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
522. Seraphim v. Judicial Conduct Panel, 483 F. Supp. 295, 298-99 (E.D. Wis.
1980).
523. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980). For the purposes of this article there is no need to enumerate the specific acts.
Suffice it to say the judge was found to have accepted gifts from a car dealer for an
extended period of time and failed to report them in the required annual financial
statement. Id at 500-01, 294 N.W.2d at 494 (Rules 8 & 17(e)). There were five separate incidents with sexual overtones involving women, four of whom were complete
strangers to the judge, which amounted to gross personal misconduct. Id at 501-03,
294 N.W.2d at 495 (Rule 11). There were also numerous acts of misconduct on the
bench concerning commenting on the merits of litigation pending before him, intimidating lawyers and litigants, using bail as an instrument of retaliation, showing disrespect for other trial and appellate courts, refusing to listen to attorneys' arguments
and aligning himself with the prosecution in criminal cases, all of which amounted to
persistent and aggravated disregard of the standards a judge should conform to,
which, when added together, amounted to a rule violation. Id at 504-11,294 N.W.2d
at 495-99 (Rules 15 & 16).
524. Id at 488-89, 294 N.W.2d at 489.
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cluded that the specific facts as found by the panel constituted willful violations. The supreme court rejected this
argument, holding that the facts found by the panel were not
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence and that its conclusion that the facts constituted violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics was not incorrect. 25 The
judge argued that because many of the cases involved in the
panel hearing had already been appealed to and affirmed by
the supreme court, the court had implicitly condoned his
conduct by its failure to reverse on grounds of misconduct.
The supreme court rejected this condonation argument by
stating:
The fact that none of the cases over which [the judge] presided were reversed by this court because of judicial misconduct does not mean that no misconduct occurred or that
this court condoned that which did occur. It means only
that this court found no judicial misconduct that
had so
5 26
seriously affected the trial as to warrant reversal.
The court
suspended the judge without pay for three
5 27
years.
The procedural challenges raised in the federal section
1983528 action were taken up by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and rejected seriatim. The judge maintained that the
disciplinary measures established by the legislature 529 were
void as an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power and
offended the separation of powers doctrine. The supreme
court rejected this argument because the 1977 constitutional
amendment dealing with judicial discipline 530 expressly required such procedural statutes to be established by the legislature and because there was nothing in the state
constitution which vested the supreme court with exclusive
control over the manner in which members of the judiciary
were disciplined and removed from office. The court noted
that the Wisconsin Constitution provided for the impeachment, address and recall methods of removal in which the
525. Id at 509, 294 N.W.2d at 498.

526. Id at 511-12, 294 N.W.2d at 499-500.
527. Id at 514, 294 N.W.2d at 501.
528. See supra notes 520-22 and accompanying text.
529. Wis. STATS. §§ 757.81-.99 (1979).
530. See supra note 443.
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court had no role. The court concluded that these statutes
unconstitutional usurpation of the power of the
were not 5an
31
judiciary.
Judge Seraphim next contended that because the constitutional disciplinary measures authorizing suspension and
removal became effective in 1977, he was denied due process
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because many of the charges against him predated
the constitutional change. The supreme court rejected this
argument as an ex post facto law argument clothed in due
process terms because the prohibition against ex post facto
laws applies only to penal statutes, and judicial disciplinary
proceedings are not penal in nature. The court then rejected
the argument that the pre-1978 conduct could not be considered. The court noted that the judge had written notice of
the date of the adoption of the Code of Judicial Ethics in
1968 and of the conduct that was expected of a member of
the judiciary and had written notice of the creation of the
one-tiered judicially created commission. In light of the
overwhelming importance of the objectives which the disciplinary proceedings were intended to serve and because of
the noncriminal character of the sanctions that could be imposed, the court did not believe that due process limited
their consideration of conduct predating the constitutional
amendment. The court concluded that, even if the conduct
to be considered was so limited, a substantial portion of the
conduct complained of and found by the panel to be in violation of the code occurred after the adoption of the constituconduct was the same
tional amendment and the judge's
5 32
adoption.
its
after
and
before
The judge next challenged the statutory right of the commission to determine the hearing forum. He argued that the
statute violates due process and equal protection because
permitting the commission as the accuser to determine the
forum violates fair play. The court rejected the due process
argument, holding that due process required only that the
judge be afforded a fair and impartial hearing, not that he be
permitted to choose the fact finder. The statute challenged
531. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d at 491-92, 294 N.W.2d at 489-90.

532. Id at 492-95, 294 N.W.2d at 490-92.
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did not violate equal protection because, under the judicial
disciplinary statutes established by the legislature, all judicial officers are treated equally and afforded the same protection and rights. 33
The judge's final procedural argument was that the stat5 34
ute and rules 8, 11, 15 and 16 of the code of ethics were
unconstitutionally vague because they failed to establish precise standards of behavior for judges and thereby denied
them adequate notice of the prohibited conduct and were
overbroad because the rules proscribed constitutionally protected free speech and association. The court rejected this
argument stating that while these doctrines are generally
used to challenge laws defining criminal conduct or conditions of governmental employment, and even if the standards might not have the preciseness required of laws
defining criminal conduct, that was of no consequence because the judge was not charged with engaging in criminal
conduct, but with judicial misconduct. 35 The judge's reading of the code of ethics was not that of a layperson unfamiliar with the law, but that of a judge with twenty years'
experience on the bench and with almost twenty additional
years as an attorney. The rules were not vague and the notice provided by the code was sufficient to overcome a
vagueness challenge. The court agreed that:
While . . .Rules 8, 11, 15 and 16 may proscribe some
speech and conduct which, for other persons in other circumstances, could not be constitutionally proscribed, we do
not accept his contention that they are unconstitutionally
overbroad. It is well established "that judges, in company
with other public servants, must suffer from time to time
such limits on these rights as are appropriate to the exercise
in given situations of their official duties or functions. ' 36
On or about July 26, 1980, Judge Seraphim commenced
another section 1983 action against the State of Wisconsin,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Judicial
533. Id at 495-96, 294 N.W.2d at 492.
534. Wis. STAT. § 757.81(4)(a) (1979), provides that misconduct includes "wilful
violation of a rule of the code of judicial ethics."
535. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d at 497-500, 294 N.W.2d at 492-94.
536. Id at 499-500, 294 N.W.2d at 294 (quoting Matter of Bonin, 378 N.E.2d
669, 684 (Mass. 1978)).
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Commission, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the
same procedural due process and equal protection grounds
discussed above. 537 "The Wisconsin Judicial Commission
moved to dismiss this 1983 action on April 4, 1982, and after
briefs were filed, the district court dismissed the action on
the basis of collateral estoppel.5 38 Judge Seraphim has appealed this adverse decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 539 On December 18, 1981, the judge petitioned
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to modify the three-year sus-

pension without pay by reinstating him as a judge. In a one
dated December 23, 1981, the court denied
sentence order
5 40
petition.
the
In another case emanating from the 1980 judicial commission activities, a municipal judge was reprimanded by
the supreme court for failing to file his financial disclosure

report.5 41 This case was disposed of by a stipulation between

the commission and the charged judge dismissing the
action. 42
C.

Comparison of the Two Systems

Forty-one states have unitary or one-tiered systems in
which the investigation, prosecution and litigation with recommendation for sanctions are joined within the purview of
the commission with supreme court overview. 543 Only nine
states separate the investigative and adjudicative func537. Seraphim v. Wisconsin, No. 80-C-759 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 10, 1980).
538. Seraphim v. Wisconsin, No. 80-C-795 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 27, 1982). In its memorandum opinion and order the Federal District Court reasoned that a 1983 action
was improper because this suit was an attempt by Judge Seraphim to raise the same
federal constitutional issues raised before and determined by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980), "where he litigated freely and without reservation ...[and] where he received fair consideration of his claims by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Opinion
and order at 10).
539. Seraphim v. Wisconsin, No. 80-C-759 (E.D.Wis. Jan. 27, 1982), appealdo cketed, No. 82-1276 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 1982).
540. In re Seraphim, No. 79-1729-J (Wis. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 1981). The petition
and order will not be published in a reporter but may be found in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
541. In re Guay, 101 Wis. 2d 171, 175-76, 303 N.W.2d 669, 671-72 (1981).
542. Id
543. See supra note 432.
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tions.544 These statistics indicate that the unitary system is
preferable. The American Bar Association Joint Committee
on Professional Discipline has also stated its preference for
the unitary system. 54 The tentative draft of standards recommends that to enhance the Commission's independence
of the executive and legislative branches such judicial disciplinary bodies should report only to the state supreme court,
because the separation of powers doctrine requires commissions to operate wholly within the judicial branch of government.5 46 In this writer's opinion, this exclusiveness theory
under the guise of separation of powers is simply wrong.
The statement of the ABA committee is contrary to constitutional text, history and practice. Impeachment, address and
recall are all methods of judicial discipline wholly outside
any supreme court's authority.5 47
This writer will not attempt to prove which commission
form is better. The purpose of this comparison is to demonstrate the benefits or shortcomings of one or the other or
both in the Wisconsin experience.
Under the unitary system, in most instances, judges can
be privately reprimanded for minor indiscretions. A twotiered commission generally has no such authority because
its function is only to investigate and prosecute complaints
while the court system retains sanctioning powers. The ability to avoid publicity by privately reprimanding a judge for a
minor violation of a standard or ideal is nonexistent under
most two-tiered commissions, and such a situation is unfortunate. The present Wisconsin two-tiered commission has
adopted administrative rules which provide a method for
private admonishment in cases of minor violation of rules.548
It remains to be seen whether these regulations can pass constitutional muster. It should also be noted that individual
544. See supra note 448.
545. ABA Joint Committee on Professional Discipline, Tentative Draft, Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline]. The standards relating to judicial
discipline and disability retirement were approved by the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates at Chicago in February 1978.
546. Id at 9 (Standard 2.1 and comment).
547. See supra notes 529-31 and accompanying text. See also Cohn, supra note
513, at 244.
548. 1979 JC Rules, supra note 451, at 8-9. Rule 4.07 provides in part:
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judges are usually made aware of complaints being investigated by a commission even if they are not personally interviewed by commission staff, and they generally correct
minor problems themselves.
Wisconsin's former (unitary) commission's procedural
rules provided that if a person complaining against a judge's
conduct or petitioning for disability became dissatisfied with
the commission's disposition during the confidential phase,
that complainant could appeal the commission's ruling 5 to
49
the supreme court by way of petitioning for certiorari.

The legislature did not provide such a remedy when establishing the new two-tiered commission. This oversight
should be corrected to provide a continuum of the populist
ideal.
Both of Wisconsin's commissions have refused, and
rightly so, to provide advisory opinions. A prosecutor
should never have this dual responsibility. Still, the joint
committee on professional discipline of the ABA has acknowledged the need for an advisory body.5 50 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, under its superintending powers, could
establish an advisory committee of lawyers and judges similar to the present committee which renders advisory opinions to lawyers who desire an explanation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Of course, the advisory opinion
would not be binding on the judicial commission, but a judicial officer's good faith reliance on such an opinion could be
considered in mitigation of or as a defense to a disciplinary
charge.
Finally, both commissions have utterly failed in their edFollowing the conclusion of proceedings under § JC 4.05 or 4.06, the
commission may vote to do any of the following:
(d) Find that alleged misconduct involves any of the following and dismiss the allegation with such admonition as the commission deems appropriate:
1. The violation of only one standard of the code of judicial ethics.
2. The violation of a rule of the code ofjudicial ethics which is not wilfuL
3. The failure to perform official duties which is not wilful or persistent.
4. The alleged misconduct does not warrant prosecution because of its
minor nature or other circumstances.
549. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
550. Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline, supra note 545, at 64-65 (Standards 9.1-.3 and comments).
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ucational roles. 5 1 Every commission has as constituencies
the state judges, the court system, lawyers, litigants, the legislature and, in the last analysis, the people. All are entitled to
know the progress of the commission's annual activities. No
commission should rely on the notoriety of its public cases to
meet its educational responsibilities. A commission, through
its staff and members, should seek to participate in bar and
judicial meetings and be willing to address meetings of the
public. Wisconsin's former commission provided an annual
report to the supreme court. Unfortunately, that was the end
of the report. An annual report should be released statewide
to the news media, bar associations, bar libraries, public officials and judges. 2 Educational projects such as these must
be undertaken by the present commission if it is to retain
credibility with its constituencies.
X.

CONCLUSION

The American Bar Association, in its standards relating
to judicial discipline and disability retirement, proposes that
impeachment be retained even though it is expensive, cumbersome, ineffective and subject to political maneuvering,
but concludes that no other method of judicial removal is
justified or recommended. 53 This proposal falls on deaf
ears in populist Wisconsin, although no judge has ever been
successfully convicted and removed by impeachment. There
is no doubt that it is a dull, clumsy tool that too often
throughout its English common law and American history
was employed for political purposes. This article has noted
that its use is nearly impossible against any claimed misconduct of the federal judiciary. Its use of late, in the various
states, has been negligible. Its nonuse, with one exception,
in Wisconsin, follows the federal and other states' patterns.
But, as the ABA recommends, impeachment will be
retained.
Address of the legislature suffers from the same problems
551. It appears that this problem is endemic to all commissions. See Martineau,
The EducationalRole of Judicial Conduct Organizations, 63 JUDICATURE 227, 228
(1979).
552. I.d at 229.
553. Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline, supra note 545, at 8 (Standard 1.8
and commentary).
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as does impeachment. More importantly, however, because
address is so harshly final, its use destroys the due process
rights of fair notice, hearing and confrontation in a trial-like
atmosphere which Americans cherish. England has not employed address since the Act of Settlement, and most states
that have adopted the remedy, with the exception of Massachusetts, have also failed to use it. Wisconsin had an opportunity to eliminate this never-used accountability method
when it reorganized the court in 1977, but neither the Blue
Ribbon Committee nor the legislature discussed the elimination of address as a judicial removal remedy at that time.
Populism is implicit.
The incompatibility doctrine, which disqualifies judges,
as well as other state public officials, from holding more than
one office, is not necessarily a true populist issue; it is more
of a separation of powers issue. But it does have populist
implications, for all see clearly the danger to a republican
form of government of one person being at the same time
legislator and judge, executive and judge, or legislator and
executive. There would be simply too much concentration
of power in the hands of one person. The proper tension
between the tripartite areas of government makes for a freer
society within the Republic, and that freedom is a populist
ideal.
Wisconsin's constitutional afterthought of adopting conviction of a felony as an ipso facto cause for removal from
any public office again has its origins in the populist ideal. It
needs little discussion to establish relevance. Simply answering the question: "Do the people want a felon holding
an office of public trust?" suffices. This tool avoids the clumsiness of impeachment and the denial of due process inherent in the address method. It is swift, fair and populist.
In the early twentieth century the American and local
bar associations fought losing battles throughout the various
states against recall. Their argument that this was a vicious,
unconscionable weapon that struck at the needed independence of the judiciary has proved unfounded, at least in Wisconsin. There can be no doubt that it has been employed
because of unpopular judicial decisions, but certainly no
valid argument can be made that recall has been misused to
thwart judicial independence.
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Mandatory retirement, harsh as it is, is without doubt a
proper method of removal for age when coupled with proper
retirement benefits and a court system's need to employ able
retired judges in emergency situations. Its use enables this
state to maintain a vigorous judiciary.
The nonpartisan election of judges for stated terms has
served as a check against unbridled judicial power or corruption throughout Wisconsin's 134-year history. Sporadic
attempts at merit selection and retention have met with rebuff. The most serious or scholarly attempt at such a change
was foiled by its authors, the Blue Ribbon Committee, when
they deleted it from their 1973 proposed constitutional
changes implementing court reorganization. The elimination of the merit selection/retention proposal was a cornmonsense approach. It was a recognition that presenting this
issue to the people could jeopardize the whole of court reorganization in populist Wisconsin. It remains to be seen
whether the present Wisconsin State Bar Association's proposal meets with similar rebuff in the legislature or by a vote
of the-people. Regardless of its failings as a removal remedy, election of judges remains a popular "security blanket."
The most salutary of all these remedies is the creation of
judicial commission procedures. Their purpose is to provide
a continuous check on the judiciary for violation of a code of
judicial ethics. Their unstated purpose, however, is to protect the judiciary from unfounded complaints that are either
appellate court matters or simply attempts at harassment.
One must note that no matter how powerful one thinks a
member of the judiciary or the judiciary as a whole is, judges
and the judiciary are extremely vulnerable to unwarranted
attacks on their stewardship because they are unable to respond publicly to unfounded complaints either as individuals or collectively. The confidentiality of a commission's
investigations pending the filing of a formal misconduct
charge or disability petition admirably protects that interest.
The commission procedures also eliminate the unwieldiness
and untoward costs of impeachment and the due process
problems inherent in address, while appearing to eliminate
the political overtones of both. Populist accountability inherent in the Wisconsin ideal is realized here because the
majority of commission members are nonlawyers.
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A judge does not have to be accused of criminal conduct
or some other heinous act for the commission's mechanisms
to be employed. An alleged minor violation of either the
standards or rules of the Code of Judicial Ethics is sufficient
to begin the process. Then confidential review at the initial
stage eliminates those claims that should rightly be appellate
matters and those claims that are intended to harass or humiliate any particular judge. In this manner the judicial
commission system not only satisfies the due process rights
of the individual but also has the salubrious effect of
quenching populist thirst for accountability in a public
manner.
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Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

70
18
25
5
260
73
32
3
29
176
96
8
12
161
108
n/a
97
27
19
13
100
54
3495
87
788
77
6
20
n/a
21
77
38
692
87
40

Ohio

n/a

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

32
124
328
7
77

21
119
249
5
46

South Dakota
Tennesee
Texas

3
240
77

3
233
46

Utah
Vermont

23
13

19
9

3
1

[]

Virginia

n/a

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

37
273
n/a

35
200

68

1

60
18
17
4
237
59
27
2
24
164
57
7
10
157
94
88
19
9
6
94
53
295
38
41
68
5
14
18
55
24
600
64
34

1

1

1

6
1
4

15

4
13
3
1
3
6
21

1
2
2
4
12
1

3

2

11
1

1

2
2
6

[1]
8
3
3
4

1
1
[14]

3

1

17
39
5
6
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[1]
25
5
1

2

13

3

1

47

29
2

1

1

1
2

4
2
8
4
3

5
3
5
7
1

12

1
2
1
4

1
14
9
87
19
2
11

5
15
2
16

1
1

1

4
[3]

1

6"

1

59

39

1

4

210

9

[1]

2
6

5
9

1

12

1
1

2

10

1982]

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A

n/a Numbers not reported. Iowa, Ohio, and
Virginia restricted by confidentiality
requirements.
* Dispositions may not equal complaints
if more than one complaint submitted against a
judge. Maryland, New Jersey, Michigan, and
South Dakota reported complaints on fiscal
year.
** Some commissions do not keep exact
numbers for dispositions in this category.
1. Florida. Public Censure and fine.
2. Illinois. Case dismissed by Courts
Commission after hearing.
3. Kentucky. Voluntary temporary
retirement.
4. Louisiana. Mandatory age retirement.
5. Michigan. Includes 31 pending
complaints.
6. Michigan. Resigned and retired dispositions compiled together.

7. Minnesota. One retiredjudge not to be
assigned cases; supreme court dismissed three
cases as moot or rerjudicata.
8. Mississippi. Numbers cover first seven
months of commission's operation.
9. Pennsylvania. One judge refused to resign to run for nonjudicial office and supreme
court declared the office vacant. One judge reinstated after criminal charges were dismissed.
One judge's term expired during investigation;
the office was declared vacant and case dismissed as moot.
10. South Carolina. Two judges not reappointed by governor.
11. Texas. Two judges resigned after being indicted.
12. Washington. No commission in 1980.
13. West Virginia. Case dismissed as moot
when judge failed to win reelection.

